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industry, Congress hoped only to stabilize the airlines briefly and reassure the nation without
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INTRODUCTION
On September 11, 2001, almost immediately after receiving clearance to
reenter the Capitol,' the United States Congress began the task of responding
to the terrorist attacks. The first sessions were filled with tributes to the dead2
and massive appropriations for rebuilding,3 but by Friday, September 14, three
days after the worst terrorist attack in the nation's history, the House of
Representatives met late into the night to discuss one thing: whether to supply
the commercial-aviation industry with the largest one-time corporate bailout in
American history.4
Although the airlines were officially deregulated in 1978, 5 the industry
continued to function as the "prodigal child" of the federal government.6 This
unusual, hybrid relationship emerged from the unique set of expectations
facing the post-regulation industry. Even absent direct government control,
consumers wanted airlines to operate with the "reliability of utilities, providing
frequent flights on-time" to many destinations "at low cost and with cozy
amenities. '7 At the same time, both Congress and the public expected the
airlines to function as separate businesses in the public marketplace,8
protecting workers' salaries, surviving on razor-thin margins, and facilitating
1. See, e.g., John Lancaster & Helen Dewar, Outraged Lawmakers Vow To Keep Hill Going,
WASH. POST, Sept. 12, 2001, at A2i.
a. See, e.g., 147 CONG. REc. E1635 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 2001) (statement of Rep. Coble).
3. See Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Recovery from and Response to
Terrorist Attacks on the United States, Pub. L. No. 107-38, 115 Stat. 220 (2001)
(appropriating $40 billion in emergency aid).
4. The savings and loan bailout has been spread out over the course of a number of years. See
infra note 224. For a list of recent congressional bailouts, see Deborah Groban Olson, Fair
Exchange, 15 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y (forthcoming 2006). For more on Congress's
deliberations, see Elizabeth Kolbert, The Calculator: How Kenneth Feinberg Determines the
Value of Three Thousand Lives, NEW YORKER, Nov. 25, 2002, at 46.
5. See Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
6. Edward Wong, The Impossible Demands on Americas Airlines, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2002, § 4
(Week in Review), at 4.
7. Id.
8. As former airline executive Michael E. Levine remarked, "[w]hen I complain to my
congressmen about the hotel industry, I get a polite letter saying they feel my pain....
Nobody introduces a bill to regulate the hotel industry. But on airlines, they threaten to
hold hearings." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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economic activity. As a result, the deregulated industry was still monitored
closely by the federal government.9
In the months before September ii, the airline industry" experienced
particular difficulties due to the growth of low-cost carriers, decrease in
business demand, and rich labor contracts negotiated during the 199os boom.
Unable to reduce excess capacity or abrogate labor agreements, the airlines
approached Labor Day 2001 facing losses of between $21 and $312 billion. The
government's response, however, was not sympathetic. Choosing to blame the
industry's woes on management, Congress was concerned less with the
carriers' financial position than with their treatment of passengers. As late as
August 2001, Congress held "a series of hearings and threatened to approve a
robust passenger rights bill despite industry lobbying efforts."1 3 The prospect
of a congressional bailout was simply inconceivable.
But all of this changed on September 11 when an industry that was already
at the breaking point saw its "economic rubber band snapped."' 4 Within hours
of the attacks, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) issued the first ever
national groundstop order requiring the shutdown of U.S. airspace.15 With
fixed costs upwards of 8o%,6 the airlines started hemorrhaging hundreds of
9. After terminating the Civil Aeronautics Board, Congress required the airlines to continue
supplying monthly data to the Department of Transportation. See Bureau of Transp.
Statistics, Dep't of Transp., About BTS, http://www.bts.gov/about (last visited Aug. 30,
2005).
1o. Throughout this Note the term "airline industry" will primarily apply to the major, pre-
deregulation hub-and-spoke carriers. I will make a distinction when factors affecting other
players in the industry, such as low-cost or regional carriers, are relevant.
11. Scott McCartney et al., Capital Flight: As Big Losses Widen, an Airline Shake-Up Appears
Unavoidable, WALL ST. J., Nov. 6, 2oo, at Al (citing UBS Warburg analyst Samuel
Buttrick).
12. See James M. Higgins & Cristopher Kennedy, Pondering the Imponderable: Short- and Longer-
Term Thoughts on the Airlines 3 (Credit Suisse First Boston, Equity Research Report, Sept.
14, 2001) (referring to the authors' prior forecast of a $2.6 billion loss).
13. Daniel H. Rosenthal, Note, Legal Turbulence: The Court's Misconstrual of the Airline
Deregulation Act's Preemption Clause and the Effect on Passengers' Rights, 51 DUKE L.J. 1857,
1858 (2002) (addressing the appropriate scope of passenger rights); see also James R. Asker,
Why Are Passengers So Angry at Carriers?, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Oct. 25, 1999, at 50,
52 (assessing customer satisfaction with commercial aviation carriers).
14. Frank Lorenzo, Airlines' Woes Didn't Start on Sept. 11, WALL ST. J., Nov. 14, 2001, at A22.
15. NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, THE 9/11 COMMISSION
REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE
UNITED STATES 25 (2004) [hereinafter 9/11 REPORT].
16. See infra note 136 and accompanying text.
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millions of dollars per day,17 leading to calls for government assistance even
before planes were back in the sky. Industry lobbyists, 8 Wall Street analysts, 9
and national newspapers2" all highlighted the industry's complex predicament:
Insurance plans had been canceled or made significantly more expensive;2'
credit markets, unsure about the liability facing the airlines, had all but dried
up;22 airline workers were being laid off by the tens of thousands;23 and the
ripple effects were spreading across the "just-in-time" economy.' To make
matters worse, airline equity values were poised to plunge once the markets
reopened," and a number of carriers were rumored to be headed for
bankruptcy. In Congress, a consensus developed that the nation's airlines-a
symbol of the flag26 -could not be made victim to the terrorists. What
emerged, only eleven days after the attacks, was the Air Transportation Safety
and System Stabilization Act (ATSSSA) of 2001,27 an $18 billion" federal
17. See infra Subsection I.C.2.
18. See Scott McCartney et al., Mayday Call: U.S. Airline Industry Faces Cash Crunch, Pleads for a
Bailout, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 2001, at Ai; Scott Thurm et al., Flight Ban Slows 'Just in Time'
Factories, WALL ST. J., Sept. 13, 2OO, at B3.
19. See James M. Higgins & Cristopher Kennedy, Airlines: Latest Thinking on Outlook for Airlines
1 (Credit Suisse First Boston, Equity Research Report, Sept. 17, 2001); Raymond E. Neidl,
Airline CEO's Testify Before House Subcommittee on Aviation (ABN Amro, Equity Research
Report, Sept. 20, 2001).
2o. See, e.g., Editorial, Flying Unfriendly Skies, WALL ST. J., Sept. 14, 2001, at Aao (supporting aid
to the airlines); Editorial, Rescuing the Airlines, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 19, 2001, at A26.
21. See, e.g., H.R. 2981, To Preserve the Continued Viability of the United States Air Transportation
System, Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Transp. and Infrastructure, 1o7th Cong. 46-47 (Sept.
19, 2001) [hereinafter House Hearings].
22. See infra Part I.
23. See Scott McCartney et al., Airlines To Lay Off Thousands as Bookings Plummet, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 20, 2001, at A3; Editorial, No Time To Bail, WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 2001, at A2o.
24. See Thurm et al., supra note 18. Just-in-time describes a production process in which
inventory arrives just in time for it to be used in production. This allows manufacturers to
save significant operational costs and to improve their working capital management.
25. See Scott McCartney et al., Frightened Workers and Investors Buffet Airlines, WALL ST. J., Sept.
18, 20O1, atA3.
26. See John Newhouse, A Reporter at Large: Air Wars, NEwYORKER, Aug. 5,1991, at 51.
27. ATSSSA, Pub. L. No. 107-42, 115 Stat. 230 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 40,1O1 note (Supp. I
2001)).
28. This figure includes authorization for the President to allocate $3 billion from the $40
billion Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for use in improving aviation security.
See Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Recovery from and Response to
Terrorist Attacks on the United States, Pub. L. No. 107-38, 115 Stat. 220, 221 (2001);
ATSSSA § 501; see also 147 Cong. Rec. S9593 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 2001) (statement of Sen.
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bailout that had been conceived, drafted, and signed amid a marked sense of
crisis.
The Act, which was passed without amendment in both the Senate and
House, sought to stabilize the airlines in a manner that distinguished between
pre- and post-September 11 losses. While broad- including the establishment
of a Victim Compensation Fund29 and tax postponements ° - it contained only
four central terms: (1) $5 billion in direct compensation to the airlines for all
losses suffered in 2001 as a result of the terrorist attacks;3" (2) the authorization
of an additional $10 billion in loan guarantees to be approved by the newly
created Air Transportation Safety Board (ATSB) based on rules promulgated
by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB);32 (3) the capping of carrier
liability for the September 11 attack and future terrorist attacks;33 and (4) the
government's assumption of substantial insurance costs and risks. 4 By mixing
immediate cash assistance and liability relief with longer-term loan guarantees,
Congress was able to act quickly without effectively re-regulating the industry.
The reactions to the Act were fast and, at times, furious. Major airlines
feared that the OMB's standards for loans would be set too high, while labor
leaders,3" along with representatives from other affected industries,36
denounced the Act for its exclusive focus on the carriers. Even members of
Congress publicly speculated-as early as October 1, 2001- that the Act had
been overly generous.37 On the other side of the ledger, the New York Times
applauded the Act's (apparent) recognition that government could be a catalyst
for economic change, while the Air Transport Association (ATA) expressed
gratification that the nation's airlines would not be allowed to become "the first
Boxer) ("I am particularly pleased with the language in this bill that commits $3 billion of
the $40 billion in the emergency funding that we passed last week for airline security.").
29. ATSSSA § 401.
30. Id. 5 301.
31. Id. § lol(a)(2). The aid was distributed based on the lesser of direct losses or proportional
August capacity, measured in available seat miles (ASMs). The Act did not make an
allocation distinction between different types of carriers (e.g., regional, low-cost), save its
reservation of $500 million for cargo operations such as Airborne Express and FedEx. See id.
§ o3(b)(2)(B)(i).
32. Id. 5 ioi(a)(1).
33. Id. § 4o8.
34. Id. § 201.
35. See Martha Brannigan et al., U.S. Bailout Will Keep Airlines Flying Amid Downturn, WALL ST.
J., Sept. 24, 20ol, atA3.
36. See infra note 1o6 and accompanying text.
37. See Tom Hamburger, Senator Suggests Airline-Aid Package Needs To Be Altered, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 1, 2001, at Alo.
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economic casualty of this war." 8 The sheer enormity of the sums, combined
with the responsibilities the Act imparted on the government, convinced both
supporters and detractors alike that Congress would be taking a leading role in
reviving the industry.
Nearly four years later, however, this conclusion is being drastically
reconsidered. In the end, Congress disbursed $4.6 billion in direct
compensation to the airlines-$400 million less than the statute authorized.
The ATSB managed to extend $1.56 billion in loan guarantees, 9 but rejected
almost $2 billion in requests, including applications from US Airways, United,
and Vanguard that could have saved those carriers from bankruptcy.4" The
Board actively discouraged other applications by requiring bankruptcy-like
concessions and steep compensation. Although the industry is no longer in
danger of imminent collapse, it is still in a state of flux, with carriers at all cost
levels facing margin pressures and significant losses.41
In light of these events, it is easy to deem the ATSSSA a failure, or at least a
poor effort in comparison to previous congressional bailouts. After all,
Chrysler, the most famous recipient of congressional-bailout funds, 42 returned
to health in under three years, netting the federal government a profit of $311
million.43 But to assess the ATSSSA in such terms is to overlook the Act's
unique circumstances and motivations. It is true that Congress was helping the
airlines to redeploy capital in response to unanticipated business conditions,
thus branding the Act a "bailout."44 Yet its aim was never to ensure the
indefinite survival of each carrier or to rehabilitate the nation's commercial
aviation industry. Rather, as this Note will argue, Congress conceived of the
Act as a public relations measure, designed to return the airlines to their pre-
September 11 positions and prevent the spectacle of mass carrier bankruptcies
immediately following the terrorist attacks. Unlike previous bailouts, which
38. Brannigan et al., supra note 35 (quoting Carol Hallet, President, ATA).
39. The Financial Condition of the Airline Industry: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the
H. Comm. on Transp. and Infrastructure, io8th Cong. 206 (2004) (testimony of Michael
Kestenbaum, Executive Director, ATSB) [hereinafter Hearing on Financial Condition].
40. US Airways's application was eventually approved. See Air Transp. Stabilization Bd., U.S.
Dept. of the Treasury, Recent Activity, http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/domestic-
finance/atsb/recent-activity.shtml (last visited Sept. 30, 2005).
41. See Gary Chase, Hub Economics Vulnerable 3 (Lehman Brothers, Equity Research Report,
Oct. 1, 2004).
42. Chrysler Corporation Loan Guarantee Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-185, 93 Stat. 1324 (198o)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §5 1861-1875 (2000)).
43. See Robert B. Reich, Bailout: A Comparative Study in Law and Industrial Structure, 2 YALE J.
ON REG. 163,187 (1985).
44. See id. at 163.
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were designed to overcome market dictates permanently, the ATSSSA was
formulated to stabilize the industry only briefly and to reassure the nation
without severely distorting the market forces that had been operating since
deregulation.4s The ATSSSA was thus more a symbolic salve than an industry
savior, a prophylactic measure to avoid the possibility of a public relations
calamity.
This Note, then, will assess the ATSSSA and explain why it was passed,
how well it met its objectives, and whether it might serve as a template for the
future. This is no idle academic exercise. In the event of future attacks, it is
likely that the airlines, or a host of other industries, will come calling on
Congress to provide immediate, lifesaving assistance. With the economy
hanging in the balance, it should already be known whether a statute
resembling the ATSSSA would provide a reliable, appropriate, and efficient
response. 46
Accordingly, Part I will study the genesis of the Act, tracking its
development from the first discussion in the House the day after the attacks to
its passage eleven days later. Looking closely-for the first time-at
congressional debates, committee hearings, Wall Street reports, and newspaper
editorials, this Note will attempt to capture Congress's understanding of the
industry's predicament as well as the philosophy behind the Act's formulation.
What emerges is a portrait of an Act designed to let the carriers tread water
only until the period of national tragedy had passed. From this perspective, the
industry's current predicament, including its multiple bankruptcies post-2001,
is demonstrative of the Act's success rather than its failure.
After outlining Congress's approach to the Act, Part II will briefly examine
the Act's immediate effects. This, in turn, will set the stage for the Note's final
Part, which will assess both whether the ATSSSA was successful and whether
it was the best available option given the political and economic circumstances.
In answering these questions, I will compare the ATSSSA to previous
congressional bailouts and argue that while federal assistance programs are
often viewed negatively, they are typically the inevitable political response to
45. It could thus be said that Congress had two distinct yet interrelated goals: providing the
airlines with a public boost without (too) seriously distorting the industry's long-term
market forces.
46. Even without another terrorist attack, the airlines could find themselves in need of federal
assistance in the near future. As of October 2oo4 the industry had an estimated $31 billion in
underfunded pension liabilities. A default on these plans could necessitate a congressional
bailout of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation. See GAO, No. GAO-o5-lo8T, PRIVATE
PENSIONS: AIRLINE PLANS' UNDERFUNDING ILLUSTRATES BROADER PROBLEMS WITH THE
DEFINED BENEFIT PENSION SYSTEM (2004) (testimony of David M. Walker, Comptroller
General, before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation).
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specific social and economic circumstances. As such, bailouts should be judged
by determining whether Congress chose the optimal tools for accomplishing its
goals. In most cases, this will mean providing stability without significantly
distorting free-market conditions. Viewed in this light, I maintain, the
ATSSSA should be considered a legislative success.
I. "CONGRESS: WE HAVE A PROBLEM"
On September 12, as the nation grappled with attacks, 460 normally busy
airports were at a standstill with all 40,000 scheduled flights canceled for a
second straight day.47 Due to high fixed costs in labor, leases, and debt service,
airlines typically need to fill more than 65% of their seats just to break even,48
with the "presence or absence of just a few passengers on each flight
[determining] the difference between profits and losses. ' 49 Inevitably, the
absence of all passengers for the four-day groundstop translated into
catastrophic losses.
Even more devastating, however, was the toll the attacks were expected to
take on the airlines' longer-term prospects. Only the day after the attacks,
Midway Airlines, a small regional carrier that had filed for Chapter 11
bankruptcy in August with the intention of reorganizing, ceased operations,
noting: "We anticipated over the next few weeks there wasn't going to be
much air travel.... We saw the handwriting on the wall. 50 On September 13,
a Harris poll found that 39% of Americans planned to avoid flying over the
next few months,51 while a Wall Street JournaliNBC News survey showed that
67% of those responding were "somewhat or very worried about the risk of
terrorism in connection with commercial air travel."5 2
The attacks also created a number of structural problems for the airline
industry. The major carriers operate a hub-and-spoke system that allows
travelers to journey between many cities by connecting through a central
location. The system functions by flying a flock of planes into the hub at a
41. See Glenn Kessler & Don Phillips, Air Travel System Grounded for First Time, WASH. POST,
Sept. 12, 2001, at All ("Officials said that on a normal day, there are about 4,000 to 5,000
flights in the air at a given time; there are 35,000 to 40,000 commercial flights a day in the
United States.").
48. McCartney et al., supra note 18 ("In the best years, only 75% to 8o% of seats are full.").
4g. Id.
50. Michael J. McCarthy, Airlines Expected To Post Sizable Losses After Attacks, WALL ST. J., Sept.
13, 2001, atA3.
s1. Id.
52. McCartney et al., supra note 18.
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single time and then reorganizing passengers to turn around in a rush. As a
result, travelers in Des Moines, Iowa are always only one stop away from
Osaka, Japan. The system creates a true network 3 that provides business
travelers with "go-anywhere, go-anytime convenience" and leisure travelers
with lower fares than "could be charged in a less comprehensive system with a
less differentiated price structure." 4 For the hub-and-spoke system to function
most efficiently, the airlines must be able to turn passengers around quickly,
keeping planes on the ground for as little time as possible. In the days
immediately following the terrorist attacks, however, it was clear that new
security measures would preclude airlines from flying the "frenetic schedules of
the past.""5 To survive, the big airlines would need to identify new ways to run
their hub-and-spoke systems efficiently, amid deep stock market losses and
closed capital markets.
A. Initial Response
The newly minted "War Congress" responded swiftly to the airlines'
predicament. In the late evening of Friday, September 14, the House
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure and the Committee on Ways
and Means sought unanimous consent to submit a bill to preserve the
continued viability of the U.S. air transportation system. s6 As introduced by
Representative Don Young of Alaska, Chairman of the House Transportation
and Infrastructure Committee, House Bill 2891 was designed to avoid an
imminent meltdown of the airline industry. Young went to great lengths to
characterize the bill as a response to the government's shutdown of the national
airspace, painting the airlines as the unfortunate victim of the FAA's national
security directive. In a period marked by its decisive harmony, Representative
Young's challenge to his colleagues was unusually contentious and reflected the
difficulties he was facing in overcoming Congress's traditional hostility toward
aiding the airlines:
[I]f my colleagues decide not to support this bill, then my colleagues
suffer the facts, because my colleagues will not be able to fly. And I said,
53. See Bradley H. Weidenhammer, Note, Compatibility and Interconnection Pricing in the Airline
Industry: A Proposal for Reform, 114 YALE L.J. 405 (2004) (assessing the airline industry as a
network).
S4- Michael E. Levine, Looking Back and Ahead: The Future of the U.S. Domestic Airline
Industry 4 (2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
55. McCartney et al., supra note 18.
56. A Bill To Preserve the Continued Viability of the United States Air Transportation System,
H.R. 2891, 1o7th Cong. (2001).
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ride your horses, paddle your canoes, and go where you think you may
go. But the airline industry, and I am the chairman of this committee, is
in serious, serious trouble.... [T]his tragedy was not their doing....
And let me tell my colleagues, those that want to fly, fly; but do not do
it just with wings from the airplanes, fly with yourself. Try flapping
your arms; you are not going to get there. You are not going to get
there.?7
The bill that Young supported authorized the President to grant the airlines
$2.5 billion in immediate compensation for the groundstop order and $12.5
billion in loan guarantees for a period up to six months. s8 It was backed by
many in Congress "so that when financial markets open on Monday, airline
stocks do not tank and airlines do not go under and... shut down forever."5 9
Although it garnered significant support on the floor, House Bill 2891 was
scuttled 6' because it sacrificed completeness for speed. By failing to address the
airlines' liability and insurance problems, it overlooked factors that could
actually have grounded the carriers.6 ' More importantly, its drafters did not
take enough time to collect accurate information. For example, Representative
James Oberstar, the transportation committee's ranking member, commented
on the floor- incorrectly- that the airlines would accumulate losses of up to $5
billion over the weekend.62 In reality, it took the industry most of the fourth
quarter to rack up losses of that magnitude. Had House Bill 289i become law,
it would have required amendment almost immediately.
This does not mean, however, that the bill was not important to the
development of the ATSSSA. While flawed, its near success reveals that only
three days after the attacks a significant portion of the House had already
57. 147 CONG. REc. H5685 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 2001).
58. H.R. 2891 § 1(2)-(3), 3.
59. 147 CONG. REc. H5685 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 2001). What the bill's supporters overlooked was
that the Senate had already recessed until the following Wednesday, making it impossible
for the bill to become law over the weekend.
6o. The bill was never actually voted on because the Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure and the Committee on Ways and Means were seeking unanimous consent to
bypass the normal hearing process and submit the bill for an immediate vote. See Rob
Hotakainen & Sarah McKenzie, House Rejects Oberstar Plan To Aid Airlines, STAR TRIBUNE
(Minneapolis, Minn.), Sept. 15, 2OO, at A27.
61. The bill's drafters also failed to provide a mechanism for government upside participation,
in the form of warrants, which had been a staple of previous bailouts. Such provisions
reimburse taxpayers for the risks incurred while also incentivizing companies to think
carefully before relying on government loan guarantees.
6a. 147 CONG. REC. H5685 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 2001).
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accepted that the airline industry was in crisis, that this crisis was a direct result
of the terrorist attacks, and that Congress had a responsibility to act.
B. A Bill Becomes a Law
1. Statistical Underpinnings
When Congress reconvened the following week to discuss the airlines'
predicament in earnest, it found an industry in free fall. 6" On September 17, the
first day of resumed trading, the Dow Jones Industrial Average lost 685 points,
roughly 7% of its pre-attack value.6 4 While significant, these losses paled in
comparison to the 40% plunge in the American Stock Exchange (AMEX)
Airline Index6 I and the performance of the individual carriers. At the closing
bell, "Continental and US Airways, each with among the highest debt loads in
the industry, [had] lost roughly so% of their value." 6 6 American, United,
Delta, and Northwest were down 37% to 45%, while America West, "where
concerns about its cash position abound[ed]," plunged 65%. The market even
turned sour on Southwest, selling the industry's star to a 24% loss.67
The market was reacting to an industry that was a shell of its former self.
Although the groundstop order had been lifted by Friday, September 14,
airlines were flying at 78%68 of their pre-attack capacity with system-wide load
factors-the percentage of seats filled-falling to below 40%.69 New airline
reservations were reportedly down by 5o%, 7° and layoffs were widely expected
63. The fact that Congress slowed down the process and chose to spend a full nine days
assessing the airlines' predicament does not mean that the ATSSSA's passage complied with
the normal rigors of the legislative process. The failure of House Bill 2891 meant that the
committees would actually hold hearings, yet as explained below, these sessions were often
quick and highly scripted. In addition, the nearly unprecedented support for the Act-which
eventually passed the Senate ninety-nine to one -along with the consensus that something
needed to be done quickly, meant that the negotiating process could be seriously curtailed.
64. See Gretchen Morgenson, Wall St. Reopens Six Days After Shutdown; Stocks Slide 7%, but
Investors Resist Panic, N.Y. TiMEs, Sept. 18, 2001, at Al.
65. For more on the index see AMEX Airline Index (XAL), http://www.analyzeindices.com/
ind/airlines.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2005).
66. McCartney et al., supra note 25.
67. Id.
68. See Airport Security: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., and Transp., 107th Cong.
14 (2001) (statement of Norman Y. Mineta, Secretary, Department of Transportation).
69. Martha Brannigan et al., Car Sales, Air Travel Show Slight Pickup, WALL ST. J., Sept. 25, 2001,
atA2.
70. Id.
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to exceed 1OO,OOO. 7' Realizing that its position had deteriorated even from the
week before, the industry responded by "publicly pleading and privately
lobbying for a congressional bailout." 72 The intense effort, which included
representatives from the unions,73 the airlines, 74 and insurance companies, 7
focused on securing federal funds for groundstop compensation, loan
guarantees, antitrust exemptions, tax rebates, and a terrorism-insurance
program that would make the government the insurer of last resort. In a Wall
Street Journal op-ed entitled A Helping Hand for Airlines Isn't a 'Bailout,' Robert
L. Crandall, retired Chairman of American Airlines, argued that the airlines'
tenuous predicament affected the entire economy because the industry employs
"more than i.1 million people, [has] payrolls of about $250 billion and
account[s], directly or indirectly, for about 1o% of U.S. gross domestic
product.' '76 Crandall then offered a concrete plan-"not a bailout" - for
government assistance that mirrored much of what was being discussed on
Capitol Hill.
While Congress was not willing to accept all of the industry's claims and
suggestions, the lobbying effort succeeded in convincing legislators, even those
House members who had opposed House Bill 2891, that the nation was facing
the imminent demise of its commercial aviation network. Senator Kit Bond
focused on the liability issue and consequent lack of access to capital, and
warned that unless Congress acted "within a matter of days" the entire
American economy could be "crippled."' Senators Charles Grassley and
Patrick Leahy argued that Congress could not compound the tragedy and
"allow the terrorists to win" by allowing the industry to collapse. Senator Pete
Domenici explained that without "immediate financial assistance, many
airlines face imminent bankruptcy," '79 while Senator John McCain, usually a
voice of tempered reason, remarked almost hysterically that "[i]f we do not
move ahead with financial aid and liability protection, I believe that we will
71. See McCartney et al., supra note 18.
72. Id.
73. See Martha Brannigan et al., Airline Workers Look to Congress for Aid, WALL ST. J., Sept. 26,
2001, atA3.
74. See, e.g., McCartney et al., supra note 18; John D. McKinnon et al., Airlines Lobby for Liability
ReliefAfter Insurance Firms Raise Premiums, WALL ST. J., Sept. 21, 2001, at A4.
75. See McKinnon et al., supra note 74.
76. Robert L. Crandall, Op-Ed, A Helping Hand for Airlines Isn't a 'Bailout,' WAL ST. J., Sept.
18, 2001, at A22.
77. 147 CONG. REC. S9 366 (Sept. 13, 2001).
79. Id. at S9 59 4 (statement of Sen. Grassley); id. at S9 59 9 (statement of Sen. Leahy).
79. Id. at S9597.
4IZO Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
1I5:438 2005
BAILING OUT CONGRESS
begin to see not just layoffs, but failures in the aviation industry.", 8, Even
President Bush, who was faced with strong opposition to a bailout from the
Chairman of the Federal Reserve8' and Secretary of the Treasury,s2 announced
that "[w]e will come together to . . . keep our airlines flying, with direct
assistance during this emergency."
8
,
It was thus clear on the floor of Congress that "some kind of financial
package [was] going to happen.'' s4 The question remaining, and the one that
had doomed House Bill 2891, was how to pass the aid that "the American
people [were] rely[ing] on"8s without recasting two decades of conventional
free-market thinking. It would turn out to be a far more vexing theoretical
problem than many in Congress had first supposed.
2. Theoretical Underpinnings
In today's global economy, companies from across the world compete in a
single marketplace. This implies that whereas measures of input cost, demand,
and price were previously confined to individual domestic markets,
international competitors must now compete within the same set of variables.
If a company receives a government bailout, it either realizes an artificial shift
in its marginal cost or an unexpected bump in its net worth. Either way, it can
pursue strategies, such as price reductions, unavailable to other firms.
As a result, a presumption has developed that "[a]s a general rule . . .
government[s] should not intervene to bail out private enterprise." 6 So
8o. Prepared Testimony of Senator John McCain Before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science,
and Transportation, FED. NEWS SERVICE, Sept. 20, 2001; see also Financial State of the Airline
Industry: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., and Transp., 107th Cong. 2 (Sept.
20, 2001) (statement of Sen. McCain) [hereinafter Senate Hearings].
81. "'It's easy in a period like this to do things in haste that may not be right,' Mr. Greenspan
said." Michael Schroeder, Greenspan Sees Weakness but Warns Against Haste, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 21, 2001, atA2.
82. "Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill also repeated warnings against hasty federal bailouts of
businesses flattened in the tragedy's wake." Id.
83. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the United States Response to the
Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 37 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1347, 1350 (Sept. 20, 2001).
84. Prepared Testimony of Senator Ernest F. Hollings Before the Senate Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation, FED. NEWS SERVICE, Sept. 20, 2001; see also Senate Hearings,
supra note 8o, at 1 (statement of Sen. Hollings).
85. Prepared Testimony of Senator Hollings, supra note 84.
86. Cheryl D. Block, Overt and Covert Bailouts: Developing a Public Bailout Policy, 67 IND. L.J. 951,
990 (1992). Bailouts are economically unpopular because they distort free-market forces.
This objection carries over to the political realm, but from a practical level, bailouts have
trouble garnering congressional support because they tend to benefit some companies (i.e.,
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ingrained was this anti-bailout, pro-market philosophy in the United States
that two days after the attacks, while the House was already debating House
Bill 2891, the Senate passed a Sense of the Senate Resolution condemning the
Republic of Korea's "improper" and "massive" $s billion bailout of failed
semiconductor giant Hynix.8' To make matters worse, the government had
long opposed direct financial assistance to the airline industry in particular,
concluding during the 1991-1992 aviation downturn that a bailout "would
probably do more harm than good to the competitive process.",8 It was within
this historical and ideological context that Congress approached the bailout of
the aviation industry.
The easy solution was simply to reimburse the airlines for their September
11 losses while being careful not to upset preexisting competitive conditions in
the market. The problem, however, was that there was no obvious way to
distinguish between the airlines' pre- and post-September ii losses. As
discussed above, before the terrorist attacks the major airlines were operating
in a difficult financial environment, primarily due to the growth of low-cost
carriers. When the airline industry was deregulated in 1978, it was believed that
low-cost carriers would emerge to challenge the legacy carriers both regionally
and on transcontinental flights. But the "dinosaurs ''8 9 did not give up that
easily. As Professor Levine explains, the major carriers "proved surprisingly
resourceful and resilient in the face of low cost, new entrant competition. Over
the constituents of some members of Congress) at the expense of others. Accordingly,
because most members of Congress will be opposed to most bailouts, the implicit solution is
to maintain a general anti-bailout ethos. The airlines were a rare case because they play a
crucial role in the larger economy, yet it should be noted that representatives from the most
affected areas were the first proponents of the Act. For example, as expressed by Rep. Neil
Abercrombie of Hawaii on September 14, 2001:
I am here to tell Members that the State of Hawaii is at risk of bankruptcy if there
is not confidence in the people of this country being able to fly. I am not trying to
deal with hyperbole, I am not trying to deal in rhetorical flights, I am saying the
basic, fundamental, fiscal facts of life for my State.
147 CONG. REC. H568 5 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 2001).
87. Sense of the Senate Resolution Regarding the Republic of Korea's Improper Bailout of
Hynix Semiconductor, 147 CONG. REC. S 9 4 56 (2001) (reporting the inclusion of the Senate
Resolution supplemental amendments to an appropriations act). The bailout consisted of a
$2.3 billion debt-for-equity swap. The creditor banks participating in the bailout were either
partially or wholly owned by the South Korean government. See Jack Robertson, Hynix
Refinancing Package May Trigger U.S. Response, ELECTRONICS SUPPLY & MANUFACTURING,
Sept. 20, 2001, http://www.my-esm.con/story/OEG200lo92oSoo83.
88. Block, supra note 86, at 953 (quoting Our Nation's Transportation and Core Infrastructure,
Hearings Before the H. Comm. on Pub. Works and Transp., lo2d Cong. 234 (Mar. 5, 1991)
(statement of James B. Busey, Administrator, FAA)).
89. See Levine, supra note 54, at 3.
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the years, they developed hub-and-spoke systems, frequent flyer programs,
alliances, differentiated price structures, corporate discounts, travel agent
incentive programs, revenue-management programs and computer
reservations systems." 9° These innovations enabled the legacy airlines to defeat
two waves of low-cost-carrier entry in the early 198os and 199os.
Yet by the late 199os and early 2000S, the legacy carriers' stranglehold on
the industry began to weaken as low-cost regional carriers like Southwest,
JetBlue, Air Tran, Frontier, and Spirit started taking advantage of economic
conditions to improve their competitiveness. This was more than a recession
"price play," for the legacy carriers had beaten back a similar wave of low-cost
entrants during the 1991-1992 downturn.91 Rather, the low-cost carriers were
finally succeeding because the recession arrived in a period in which the
Internet was enabling customers to search for cheaper fares efficiently. By 2001,
even business travelers were comparing prices, 92 leading to a 41% drop in
business demand between January and July.93 Once customers were prepared
to fly to Oakland and Baltimore on JetBlue rather than to San Francisco and
Washington on United, the hub-and-spoke carriers had no choice but to match
prices. Their cost structures, however, could not compete with those employed
by the low-cost carriers, 94 which benefited from younger, monolithic fleets 95
and cheaper labor.96 As a result, while the low-cost carriers were better
positioned to excel in the market conditions of 2001, the legacy carriers -with
their still-dominant market shares and economic clout-would benefit most
from a bailout.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 4.
92. "[T]here is evidence that small regional carriers have been taking advantage of cutbacks by
major carriers in the current market to attract business travelers, who have traditionally
tended to give their business to the major airlines that operate hub-and-spoke operations."
Margaret M. Blair, The Economics of Post-September 11 Financial Aid to Airlines, 36. IND. L.
REV. 367, 374 n.47 (2003).
93. See House Hearings, supra note 21, at iol (statement of Susan Donofrio, Senior U.S. Airline
Analyst, Deutsche Bank Alex. Brown).
94. See Micheline Maynard, Airlines' Woes May Be Worse in Coming Year, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27,
2004, at Ai ("And as JetBlue, Southwest and other low-fare airlines keep a lid on prices, the
big airlines cannot raise fares substantially to give themselves a cushion as they once might
have done.").
95. See Melanie Trottman & Scott McCartney, Executive Flight: The Age of 'Wal-Mart' Airlines
Crunches the Biggest Carriers, WALL ST. J., June 18, 2002, at Ai.
96. While labor costs at United and Delta exceeded 40% of revenue, low-cost carriers were only
paying between 25% and 30%. Id. See also Chase, supra note 41, at 6 (noting the cost
differentials between legacy and low-cost carriers).
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The solution reached by Congress was to hinge the entire Act -including
the emergency funds, loan guarantees, insurance, and liability cap -on the
ephemeral concept of "direct September 11 losses." This way, Congress could
legitimately argue that it was merely returning all airlines- regardless of size -
to the status quo ante, from which they would be forced to compete based on
their business models.
But how could these "direct losses" be defined in a manner that did not
undermine the entire project? Throughout the debate in both the Senate and
the House, this question was answered by scores of members who justified the
Act by emphasizing the need to compensate the airlines for the groundstop
order (and related losses). 9 The premise was explained by Representative
Mark Kennedy:
As a businessman who has a high degree of faith in the marketplace, I
am not usually anxious to look at whether or not we should be
supporting private industry. But, we as a government did ask you to
shut down and stay shut down for four days. And this deserves our
attention.
98
While reasonable, it is far from certain that the government was obligated,
legally or otherwise, to compensate the airlines for the groundstop. 99 A number
of airlines actually grounded themselves before the FAA's announcement,"'
and any attempt to fly, absent federal restriction, would not have generated
significant revenue. 01 The argument also encounters difficulty from a
constitutional "takings" standpoint, because the airlines would not have been
able to demonstrate an economically viable use for the planes during the shut-
down, °2 and the government never actually commandeered the fleet for public
97. See, e.g., 147 CONG. REC. S9366 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 2001) (statement of Sen. Bond); id. at
S959o (statement of Sen. Fitzgerald); id. at S9 598 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 2001) (statement of
Sen. Allen).
98. House Hearings, supra note 21, at 79.
99. Julie Kosterlitz, What Would Darwin Think?, 33 NAT'L J. 2994, 2995 (2001) (reporting the
view of the Cato Institute's William Niskanen that the government-ordered shutdown was a
"taking" of private property and that the airlines were entitled to compensation).
10o. 9/11 REPORT, supra note 15, at 24.
101. As noted by airline scholar Severin Borenstein, "If the government hadn't grounded them,
no one would have flown anyway .... To blame the federal government for the losses is
clearly wrongheaded." Kosterlitz, supra note 99, at 2995 (surveying economists' reactions to
the ATSSSA) (internal quotation marks omitted).
102. As noted by former Labor Secretary and bailout expert Robert Reich, "businesses routinely
suffer when government exercises its police powers to safeguard the public, as when shops
must close to allow firefighters to put out a nearby fire. Government doesn't usually
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use.10'3 Indeed, under normal circumstances it is unlikely that the concept of
groundstop compensation would have received congressional support. But
desperately in need of a rationale to distinguish between pre- and post-
September 11 losses, Congress saw the groundstop as a tangible basis upon
which to frame the financial assistance.
The quandary, however, was that while this response neatly solved the
"bailout" problem- distinguishing between pre- and post-September 11
losses -it created another, equally difficult, obstacle: The carriers were not the
only entities that had suffered direct losses from the attacks. By midweek it
became widely assumed by both management and unions that the airline layoff
toll would exceed lOO,OOO.10 4 Many of these workers were let go under force
majeure provisions that allowed the airlines to "cut costs quicker in an
emergency, such as furloughing employees without notice or cutting fleets and
pilot ranks below contractual minimums." ' Tens of thousands of airline
workers were thus unemployed without benefits directly as a result of
September ii. Other industries could also demonstrate direct losses from the
attacks. By September 20, the American Society of Travel Agents estimated
that its members had lost $437 million in "commissions and fees, including the
commissions they had to return to the airlines on canceled tickets. ' '1o6 Beyond
the agents, network television stations announced losses of $700 million on
1O,OOO unaired commercials,' 7 Boeing cut 30,000 workers after carriers
refused delivery on thirty-eight planes,"' and car manufacturers saw a steep
increase in returns by rental agencies. 9 If the theory behind the ATSSSA was
that Congress had an obligation to recreate the ex ante position, then why did
this apply to carriers but not their workers or other ailing industries? For
Congress to be able to aid the airlines under the guise of compensating for
compensate for 'takings,' other than those that involve an outright and permanent transfer
of ownership." See id. at 2995 (internal quotation marks omitted).
103. Susanna Dokupil, Rethinking the Airline Bailout (The Federalist Soc'y, National Security
White Papers, 2003), http://www.fed-soc.org/Publications/Terrorisn/airlinebailout.htm
(last visited Sept. 30, 2005).
104. See, e.g., Martha Brannigan et al., Airline Workers Look to Congress for Aid-Employees Decry
the Use of Force Majeure Clause, After Huge Bailout Plan, WALL ST. J., Sept. 26, 2oo1, at A3.
105. McCartney et al., supra note ii.
1o6. McCartney et al., supra note 23.
107. Jon E. Hilsenrath, Terror's Toll on the Economy, WALL ST.J., Oct. 9, 20O1, at B1.
loB. J. Lynn Lunsford & Andy Pasztor, Boeing May Cut as Many as 30,000 Workers, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 19, 2001, atA3.
1o9. See Hilsenrath, supra note 107. At the same time a number of sectors -such as greeting
cards, cellular phones, and defense-benefited financially from the attacks.
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direct losses, it needed to develop a philosophically sound argument for
excluding others.
Congress responded by stressing the special relationship between the
airlines and the attacks."' No other industry had seen its physical capital
hijacked by terrorists and used to murder thousands of Americans. As such, the
argument went, no other industry could make as cogent a claim that it
deserved to be returned to its pre-attack position. Congress also distinguished
the airline industry on account of its unique role in the national economy. As
noted by Senator Jay Rockefeller, "the air transport industry is not just a huge
business and employer, but it is also a critical element of our nation's
infrastructure" upon which much else depends."' Senator Kay Bailey
Hutchison used this logic to argue that the Act actually benefited labor,
explaining that "[w] hat we are doing today is trying to stabilize this industry to
keep it on its feet in very tough times so we can minimize the layoffs.". 2 The
airlines needed aid not simply to save the carriers, Congress argued, but
because the failure of such an important industry would result in significantly
more layoffs than those already contemplated. The question of how to protect
workers and other industries could be addressed in the future,"3 but it was
crucial to pass a bill immediately that ensured the continuation of commercial
aviation.1 14
There were also less theoretical arguments behind Congress's refusal to
extend the ATSSSA to benefit airline workers and other industries. At first,
many members of Congress, including most prominently Senator Bond,
io. Congress could have responded to this onslaught by hiding the aviation rescue in a
comprehensive statute, as it had with the Lockheed bailout of 1971. See Emergency Loan
Guarantee Act, Pub. L. No. 92-70, 8S Stat. 178 (1971). The Emergency Loan Guarantee Act
on its face appeared to authorize federal loan guarantees to many struggling enterprises, but
was written in a manner that practically excluded all applicants besides Lockheed. Using this
method for the ATSSSA, however, would have undermined Congress's ability to send a
strong signal of support to the nation's aviation industry. For a discussion of covert bailout
options that Congress avoided on public relations grounds, see infra Subsection III.C.1.
M. See 147 CONG. REc. $9591 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 2001).
112. Id. at S9 589 .
113. See id. at S9592 (statement of Sen. Rockefeller) ("[The Act] does not address all the needs
that this crisis has created. One important issue we will need to take up in short order is the
plight of the nearly ioo,ooo airline workers who will lose their jobs .... We must also be
prepared to look at the needs of related industries."); see also id. at S9589 (statement of Sen.
Bond) ("Let me be clear; if we delay passing this bill, as we attempt to craft a change or
adjustment on assistance for laid-off employees, we risk causing a tremendous economic
calamity.").
114. On this basis, the House refused to alter the ATSSSA to provide benefits to furloughed
workers, id. at H5915, or to companies in other industries with direct losses from the attacks.
Id. at H5929 (statement ofRep. Christensen).
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assumed that capping airline liability for September ii and future attacks
would be sufficient to allow the airlines to access market capital and hence
remain viable.1 ' Only once the losses from the groundstop order and the travel
decline became evident did negotiations begin between the congressional
committees, the Bush Administration, and the industry to supply loan
guarantees" 6 and (when the loss estimates grew again) direct compensation.
After passing a $40 billion emergency appropriation package the week of
the attack, which had grown in "2 days' time from $5 billion to $2o billion to
$40 billion,"' 7 many in Congress were reluctant to continue appropriating
enormous sums. The airlines -which played a crucial role in the economy and
had symbolic significance -would get the money necessary to make them
viable, but the other affected parties would have to wait.
In order to aid airlines without providing similar packages to others,
Congress relied on an implicit fiction that tied the concept of direct losses to
the peculiarity of the groundstop. In other words, not only was the groundstop
used as the primary justification for reimbursing the airlines' direct losses, but
it also became a requirement for showing that compensable direct losses
existed at all. This was not because the attacks did not directly affect other
major segments of the economy. Industries from the automotive to the
semiconductor were deeply injured on September ii, "' 8 yet Congress was both
more confident about their viability and less concerned about their symbolism.
The ultimate goal of the ATSSSA was to avoid the symbolic cataclysm of
multiple carriers declaring bankruptcy a short time after September ii.
Although many, if not most, of the bankrupt carriers would remain flying
during the process and either emerge or be purchased, Congress was not
interested in the public spectacle of airline bankruptcies directly after those
airlines were used in a terrorist attack. Accordingly, the ATSSSA was limited to
the airlines, for symbolic and budgetary reasons, and confined to direct losses
in order to comply - somewhat -with pervading economic thought.
115. Id. at S9 3 66 (statement of Sen. Bond).
116. See Noam Scheiber, The Airlines Sure Needed a Lift. Or Did They?, WASH. POST, Jan. 13, 2002,
at B2.
117. 147 CONG. REc. H5687 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 2oo) (statement of Rep. Obey).
118. See Hilsenrath, supra note 107.
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C. Anatomy of a Loss
i. Short-Term and Long-Term
Having arrived at a narrow philosophical justification for providing aid to
the airlines, " 9 Congress next needed to determine what mix of provisions
would succeed in returning the industry to its ex ante position. To accomplish
this without providing the airlines with too much aid, Congress needed to
receive accurate information about the nature and magnitude of the losses from
the Bush Administration's economic experts, industry leaders, and Wall Street.
From the standpoint of the finished ATSSSA, the most influential
testimony was given by David M. Walker, the Comptroller General of the
United States, who explained that the carriers were experiencing liquidity
problems because the groundstop had created a sudden revenue shortfall that
the capital markets were refusing to make up because of fears regarding the
airlines' long-term viability.12 ° By looking at the problem in two stages, Walker
explained, Congress could supply the industry with a $5 billion shot in the arm
while waiting in the wings to provide loan guarantees should a return to the ex
ante position require additional liquidity for some or all carriers. Because
Congress's goal was to forestall airline bankruptcies only briefly, the deadline
for applying for loan guarantees -Walker's "long-term" - was set at June 28,
2002, as far out as Congress was willing to tolerate."'
Walker's testimony also helped Congress recognize that while September
11 was a unique event, the procedures for the intervention could be copied from
i1i. It is important to note that there were some in Congress and the Bush Administration who
conceived of the statute more broadly-as an opportunity to truly rehabilitate the industry.
For example, Transportation Secretary Norman Mineta broke sharply from Treasury
Secretary Paul O'Neill and Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan (not to mention most
of Congress) by noting in testimony that "the task at hand... is to recognize that this key
part of the economy of this country requires new foundations ...." Senate Hearings, supra note
8o, at 15 (statement of Norman Y. Mineta, Secretary, Department of Transportation)
(emphasis added). His recommendations to Congress then included over $8 billion in direct
aid to the industry. The problem for proponents of this type of bailout- which would have
done more than return carriers to their pre-September ii positions-was that most members
of Congress were uncomfortable with a process that would allow the federal government to
choose specific winners and losers. See Letter from Senator Michael Enzi et al., to Mitch E.
Daniels, Jr., Dir., Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Oct. 2, 20Ol, reprinted in News Release,
Senator Michael Enzi, Enzi Urges Fair Allocation of Loans Under Airline Relief Package
(Oct. 4, 2001), http://enzi.senate.gov/fairall.htm (illustrating the ATSSSA's philosophical
underpinnings by denouncing the artificial selection of winners and losers).
120. Senate Hearings, supra note 8o, at 20.
121. ATSSSA, S 11(C)(2)(b), 49 U.S.C. § 40,1ol note (Supp. I 2001); OMB Air Carrier
Guarantee Loan Program, 14 C.F.R § 1300.16(a) (2005).
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previous federal assistance efforts." Specifically, Walker cautioned that loan
guarantees should be made conditional on "various forms of collateral and
equity to protect the federal interest," and that a separate federal board should
be established to review and grant them.'23 Both suggestions became part of
the ATSSSA.
We will never know whether Walker's suggestions directly influenced
Congress, or, more likely, his (prepared) testimony reflected the negotiated
position that had emerged from behind closed doors. But for a Congress
seeking to provide liquidity to the airlines without setting a dangerous
precedent or reversing deregulation, Walker's two-step formula was perfect: It
provided the opportunity to forestall immediate bankruptcies without
necessarily upending market competitiveness.
2. Five Billion Dollars in Losses
As important as Walker's testimony was to the eventual structure of the
ATSSSA, the true star of the committee hearings was Leo Mullin, CEO of
Delta Air Lines, acting as the representative for the ATA. Specifically, it was
Mullin's estimates, along with those provided by Wall Street analysts, that
helped Congress determine the magnitude of the federal assistance.
Throughout heavy questioning from both the House and Senate committees,
Mullin stayed squarely on a message he knew would resonate: The aid we are
requesting "is not a bailout" or "a business cycle problem."'" Rather, it is "a
package designed solely to recover the damages associated with the heinous
acts of September lith."'25 Mullin added that "without immediate financial
support from the government, the future of aviation is threatened." ''x6 After
explaining that the industry had "virtually no private sources of capital,"127 and
that up to three bankruptcies could be expected within the next week,2s Mullin
122. "We base our observations on... lessons learned from previous financial assistance efforts,
including those directed to individual large corporations (such as the Chrysler Corporation
and Lockheed Aircraft Corporation) as well as public entities, such as New York City."
Senate Hearings, supra note 80, at 19. Before the ATSSSA, Congress had not provided any
direct aid to the airlines since the 1978 deregulation.
123. Senate Hearings, supra note 8o, at 21, 22.
124. House Hearings, supra note 21, at 67.
12S. Id. at 27.
126. Senate Hearings, supra note 8o, at 41. Mullin defined "immediate" as no later than Friday,
September 21. House Hearings, supra note 21, at 37.
127. Senate Hearings, supra note 8o, at 41.
128. See House Hearings, supra note 21, at 37 ("1 don't think I am telling a tale out of school when
I say at least three of our.., major members of the ATA are on the brink with respect to
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moved (finally) to associate actual numbers with the industry's plight. Because
Mullin's testimony represented the industry's official request for aid, it is
important to see it in its original, cumulative buildup:
[i] [W]e as an industry experienced roughly 4 days of near zero
revenue while we continued to accumulate almost all expenses. Since
the airline industry spends about $34o million a day, their direct costs
of the 4-day halt in operations was approximately 1.36 billion.
[2] Looking beyond those 4 days, we have used our actual numbers so
far, as well as projections based on the disasters of Pan Am 103, and the
implications of the Gulf War to estimate that revenues from September
15 to September 30 will likely reach only 40 percent of what we had
expected prior to September ii. Based on that, estimated daily losses for
the 4-day shutdown total 3.36 billion.
[3] Added together, those two numbers bring the September losses to
$4.7 billion.
[4] Adding 300 million for losses by cargo and other carriers not part of
the ATA to the 4.7 billion number, we arrive at a cash infusion amount
of $5 billion for immediate term damage associated with September
alone. 2 9
The ATSSSA eventually awarded the airlines $5 billion in direct aid, yet this
does not mean that Mullin's estimates accurately reflected the airlines' financial
predicament.
Looking first at the direct losses from the groundstop, Mullin derived his
$1.36 billion estimate from the industry's daily expenditures, reminding
Congress that the FAA order halted all revenue while doing nothing to stop the
accumulation of "almost all expenses." The problem with this is that the
their financial situations, and we certainly don't want to have to utilize the jurisdictions of
the courts to settle these situations, thereby creating a further lack of confidence in an
industry with these kinds of problems."); see also Senate Hearings, supra note 8o, at i
(statement of Sen. McCain) ("I believe that the airlines are in crisis and in desperate need of
our help.").
129. Senate Hearings, supra note 8o, at 42. Mullin repeated a nearly identical calculation for the
House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. House Hearings, supra note 21, at
24.
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industry was losing money heading into the attacks,13 meaning that its daily
revenues were already insufficient to cover its daily expenses. According to
Wall Street research, published in the same period as Mullin's testimony, the
industry's pre-attack daily gross revenue was between $25o and $275 million, 3 '
generating a daily loss - based on Mullin's daily cost estimate of $340 million -
of $65 to $9o million. Mullin knew that, at the very least, Congress was going
to reimburse the airlines for their groundstop losses. By defining these losses
on the basis of expenditures, Mullin was actually improving the airlines'
position, helping them profit from the groundstop "compensation."
But the sleight of hand did not stop there. In introducing his calculations,
Mullin noted that during the groundstop the industry continued to
"accumulate almost all expenses."13 2 Thus, he continued, "[s]ince the airline
industry spends about $340 million a day, their direct cost of the 4-day halt in
operations was approximately 1.36 billion." 33 While Mullin was right to point
out the industry's high fixed costs, "almost" cannot mean "all" in any rigorous
accounting scheme. On September 17, Buckingham Research estimated that
55% of the industry's costs were fixed."M Applying this percentage to Mullin's
$340 million daily loss estimate yields daily fixed costs of approximately $187
million. This brings the direct cost of the four-day halt in operations, under
Mullin's formula, down from $1.36 billion to $748 million.
To be fair, it is possible that the Buckingham number reflects the fixed
costs of a planned shutdown, ignoring the possibility that the airlines had
already incurred some of the variable costs associated with canceled flights on
September 11 and 12. In fact, in testimony before the House Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure, Raymond Neidl of ABN Amro and Susan
Donofrio of Deutsche Bank estimated groundstop fixed costs to be 9o%13 s and
130. See Raymond E. Neidl, Airlines: Recent Developments Expected To Produce Large Industry Loss 2
(ABN Amro, Equity Research Report, Sept. 17, 2001).
131. Helane Becker, Airline Industry Review: Probable Impact of Recent Terrorist Incidents on the
Airlines 2 (The Buckingham Research Group, Equity Research Report, Sept. 17, 2001)
(estimating $250 million in daily revenue); Higgins & Kennedy, supra note 12, at i
(estimating $250-$275 million in daily losses); Niedl, supra note 130, at i (estimating $270
million in daily losses); see also House Hearings, supra note 21, at iol (testimony of Susan
Donofrio, Senior U.S. Airline Analyst, Deutsche Bank Alex. Brown) (estimating $26o
million in daily losses).
132. Senate Hearings, supra note 80, at 42 (emphasis added). Mullin repeated a nearly identical
calculation for the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. House Hearings,
supra note 21, at 24.
133. Senate Hearings, supra note 8o, at 42 (emphasis added).
134. See Becker, supra note 131, at 2.
135. House Hearings, supra note 21, at 1O5.
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8o%,136 respectively. Applying the average of their estimates to Mullin's $340
million in daily costs yields fixed costs of $289 million per day. Spread over the
four-day period, this implies cumulative losses $204 million below Mullin's
estimate.
There is also good reason to doubt Mullin's daily loss figure of $340
million. On September 17, Neidl estimated that before the attacks the nine
major carriers incurred $274 million in daily total costs. 137 Because it is unlikely
that the remaining low-cost and regional carriers would have incurred
sufficient expenditures to increase the figure by 24% (i.e., to $340 million),
Mullin's calculation seems suspiciously high. Moreover, Mullin's figures are
outright unbelievable when compared with Buckingham's estimate of $245
million in daily costs.138 Remember, because Mullin was equating "losses" with
expenditures, it was in his interest to provide as high a cost basis as possible.
Applying the fixed-cost estimate of 85% to the average of Neidl's ($274
million), Buckingham's ($245 million), and Mullin's ($340 million) estimates
produces a four-day "loss" of $974 million, 28% below Mullin's final
calculation.
Figure 1.
COMPARATIVE SHUT-DOWN LOSSES (IN MILLIONS)
Daily Total $340 $245 $274 $286 (average)
Costs
Daily Fixed $340 $135 $233 $243
Costs
Fixed as a % lOO% 55% 85% 85%
of Total (Neidl/Donofrio)
Cumulative $136o $539 $932 $974
Costs
Difference 0.0% (6o.4)% (31.5)% (28.4)%
from Mullin
136. Id. at iol.
137. See Neidl, supra note 130, at 2.
138. See Becker, supra note 131, at 2 ("We further estimate that fixed costs are about 55% of total
expenses or roughly $130 million to $140 million per day.").
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Mullin's next task was to move from the groundstop to the rest of
September, to demonstrate how the expected decrease in flying would affect
the industry's bottom line. For this stage, Mullin could not simply ask for a
reimbursement of all costs because the airlines were clearly generating revenue.
Rather, he would need to ask Congress to make up the revenues that the
airlines were losing due to the immediate drop in travel caused by the attacks.
Relying on the Pan Am 103 disaster and the 1991 Gulf War for guidance,
Mullin testified that revenues for the last sixteen days of the month would
likely reach only 40% of pre-September 11 expectations,139 costing the airlines
$3.36 billion. This implies normalized expected revenue of $350 million per
day.140 As discussed above, however, Wall Street revenue estimates-which
used the same disaster precedents -generally fell between $250 and $275
million per day. Spread over the month, this amounts to an overstatement of
between $1.2 and $1.6 billion.
During the week following the attacks, most Wall Street analysts assumed
that the terrorist strike would result in incremental losses of between $2 and $6
billion for the year.141 Mullin got to $4.7 billion in only nineteen days. Besides
overstating revenue and fixed costs, Mullin also accomplished his "feat of
estimation" by failing to build cost reductions into his September model,
including the fuel savings the industry realized during the groundstop.' 42 By
contrast, in its own review of the ATA's numbers, the GAO estimated that the
airlines saved $575 million in September fuel 43 and other'44 expenses.
139. Mullin reached his expansive revenue shortfall estimate by inexplicably assuming that the
6o% revenue decrease experienced from September 17-23 would be equaled, without
improvement, during the second week after the attack (September 24-30). Revenue actually
improved by nearly io% the following week.
140. This figure equals 60% of $5.6 billion in expected revenue from September 15-30. Divided
over sixteen days, this amounts to $350 million per day in expected revenues.
141. See, e.g., Samuel Buttrick, Airline Industry Update I (UBS Warburg, Equity Research Report,
Sept. 13, 2001); Higgins & Kennedy, supra note 12, at 3.
142. Mullin only admitted to this point after questioning from Representative Bob Menendez.
House Hearings, supra note 21, at 46-47.
143. This came to $175 million during the shutdown and $144 million from September 15-3o due
to a 20% decrease in capacity. See GAO, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT: ASSESSMENT OF THE
AIRLINE INDUSTRY'S ESTIMATED LOSSES ARISING FROM THE EVENTS OF SEPTEMBER ii, at 12-13
(2OO1) (responding to congressional request for analysis).
144. This consisted of $256 million in landing fees, passenger services, commissions, and other
variable costs. id. at 12-13.
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3. Moving the Goalposts and Declaring Victory
The reality is that hewing to Walker's delineation of short- and long-term
estimates, Mullin must have felt pressure to associate the $5 billion cash
component with immediate-term losses. But the numbers were simply too
inflated to be realistic. As a result, the Act's drafters applied Walker's "short-
term" to both the direct losses suffered during the groundstop as well as the
"incremental losses incurred beginning September 11, 2001, and ending
December 31, 2001 ... as a direct result of [the] attacks."'45 In so doing, they
were preserving the demarcation between short- and long-term losses, and
between direct aid and loan guarantees, while simply changing the exact
definitions. They were also admitting the frailty of Mullin's estimates.
The problem, however, was that not everyone in Congress picked up on
this last-minute switch and therefore continued to assume that the $5 billion
was being applied to the industry's September losses alone. This is significant
because while the confusion was understandable, the size of the loan-guarantee
package depended on projected liquidity needs that were calculated based on
the sufficiency of the $5 billion. The confusion pervaded the entire Congress.
As Senator Carl Levin explained only minutes before he voted in favor of the
Act: "This legislation provides an immediate $5 billion cash infusion to stop
the immediate hemorrhaging of the airline industry and to cover their losses for
the month of September.',,4 6 Senator Hutchison, one of the Act's chief
proponents, was similarly ill-informed, noting on the same day that "[w]hat
this bill does is have $5 billion in immediate assistance to the carriers based on
their actual losses for the grounded airplane time they have had."147 In an even
more confused conversation, Senator Peter Fitzgerald assured Senator John
Corzine that the Act enabled the Administration to demand warrants from
airlines whose compensation exceeded their groundstop losses.148 If such a
provision existed, it would have made the Act hopelessly contradictory, because
the $5 billion was specifically allocated to cover losses from the groundstop
through the end of the year.
Why the confusion? Why did members of Congress not recognize that the
bill they were about to vote on allocated $5 billion for losses incurred through
the end of 2001? Certainly, the days after September 11 were hectic, and a
number of bills were passed without adequate congressional consideration. Yet
145. ATSSSA, S lol(a)(2)(B), 49 U.S.C. § 40,lO note (Supp. 12001).
146. 147 CONG. REC. S9 5 9 5 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 2001) (emphasis added).
147. Id. at S95 9o.
148. Id.
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based on a review of the Congressional Record, I believe that the confusion
actually reveals something important about the Act's formulation.
At the time the Act was passed, the airlines were hemorrhaging cash from
both the groundstop and the steep decrease in demand. It was generally
believed that up to three airlines could run out of cash within a week, and
Congress was eager to avoid the message such failures would send so soon
after the terrorist attacks. Thus, in consultation with the President and
industry representatives, Congress determined that short-term bankruptcies
could be avoided by an immediate infusion of $5 billion.149 When it became
clear, based on Wall Street's analysis of the ATA's numbers, that the full $5
billion could not be assigned to September, Congress extended the date until
the end of the year. In essence, the Act was manufactured backwards, with the
amount that the government was willing to spend decided first and its
justification hammered out later. Not willing to lower the $5 billion in grants
that had emerged from negotiations, the congressional drafters moved the
goalposts and declared victory. Their colleagues, having only seen old versions
of the Act, simply missed the last minute switch.
4. Ten Billion Dollars in Loan Guarantees
As important as the $5 billion grant was to the industry, it was only half the
story. With consumer demand expected to lag with the new War on Terror,
the airlines also needed Congress to provide loan guarantees to ensure liquidity
once the grants were depleted. In other words, Congress needed an economic
justification for step two of Walker's demarcation. Once again, the ATA turned
to Mullin, who readily supplied a (highly suspect) number:
[1] [W]e assumed the traffic for fourth quarter would grow to 6o
percent of the previous expectations, to 75 percent of expectations by
the end of the first quarter 2002, and to 85 percent of expectations by
the end of the second quarter of 2oo2 ....
[2] Prior to the events of September 11, the industry had forecast an
aggregate cash balance on June 30, 2002 of positive 8.5 billion. With
these revenue assumptions, our new estimates now indicate instead a
negative $15.5 billion cash balance.
149. See Scheiber, supra note 116.
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[3] Thus, the events of September 11 are forecast to have a negative $24
billion impact on the industry's cash position.
[4] Now none of us knows precisely [what will happen] in the
upcoming period. These estimates pertain to a situation that has never
occurred.
[5] Hence, we also ran these same numbers in an optimistic and
pessimistic mode. Optimistically, the swing in cash balance could run
just under 18 billion.., or pessimistically as high as 33 billion.1 0
In this stage Mullin could no longer define losses as expenditures, as he had
with the $340 million, because the airlines were asking to be compensated for
lost revenues. Even then his long-term cash analysis151 was problematic on both
ends: It overstated likely revenue contraction and understated cost reductions.
The primary problem was that Mullin was using a generally static model.
Although a review conducted by the GAO in October 2001 projected $397
million in personnel-related savings from November through the end of the
year,"5 2 Mullin's numbers did not start factoring in layoff savings until 2002.
This despite the fact that by September 17 many airlines had already begun to
use force majeure clauses to quickly, and relatively inexpensively, fire tens of
thousands of workers.1 53
The revenue numbers, particularly for the remainder of 2001, were also
problematic. Mullin told Congress that the loan guarantees were needed to
(partially) offset an expected 40% decline in fourth quarter revenue, but the
ATA adjusted this projection down to a more realistic 25% in its October
submission to the GAO.' Mullin's testimony had inexplicably focused
retrospectively on demand numbers the week after the attack instead of
concentrating on the "rebuild curve." ' As UBS's Samuel Buttrick noted in his
assessment of Mullin's numbers, "[w]hile we continue to believe that this is a
highly improbable forecast, if it is (even remotely) correct, the current package
150. Senate Hearings, supra note 8o, at 42. Mullin repeated a nearly identical calculation for the
House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. See House Hearings, supra note 21,
at 21.
151. Cash shortfall is particularly relevant in the capital-intensive and fiercely competitive
aviation industry. This is especially true when bankruptcy is looming.
152. GAO, supra note 143, at 12-13.
153. See supra note 1o5 and accompanying text.
154. GAO, supra note 143, at lo-ii.
15S. Id.
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only directly addresses a fraction of the loss. If the industry forecast is correct,
there will still be multiple bankruptcies .... 'M56
Assuming that Congress did not completely distrust the ATA's loss
estimates, Buttrick's observation provides insight into the Act's purpose. As
will be discussed in Part III, the classical goal of a bailout is to utilize
government funds to avoid bankruptcy. Such a decision is made based on a
variety of social and political pressures. Yet, as Buttrick explained, the ATSSSA
was never given the teeth to truly stave off bankruptcies (regardless of whose
numbers you believed). Rather, by infusing the carriers with enough cash to
make it through 2001, Congress was merely postponing the inevitable for a
more palatable political climate. The ATSSSA was thus designed to allow all
carriers to tread water until the period of national tragedy had passed, at which
point they would be judged based on their market performance and their
importance to the economy.
II. THE ATSSSA IN ACTION
The passage of the Act partially lifted the cloud that had been gathering
over the commercial aviation industry. Instead of filing for bankruptcy en
masse, the carriers - after providing the Treasury Department with capacity
and loss statistics -received $5 billion in direct aid while preserving the
opportunity to access $1o billion in loan guarantees.' On the insurance and
liability fronts, the Act established the Victim Compensation Fund, capped tort
awards related to the attacks, , 8 and made the federal government the
industry's primary insurer.s9 Nevertheless, many in the industry and on Wall
Street remained uncertain. The ATA released a statement expressing gratitude
that "our nation's airlines will not become the first economic casualty of this
war, out followed soon thereafter with the warning that "[w] e're looking at
156. Samuel Buttrick, Airlines: Federal Aid Package 1 (UBS Warburg, Equity Research Report,
Sept. 24, 2001) (emphasis added).
157. Before receiving aid, all carriers were required to submit statistics detailing their ASMs for
the month of August 2001, as well as their estimated "direct losses" from the September ii
attacks. See ATSSSA § 1o3(b)(2)(A)(ii), 49 U.S.C. § 40,101 note (Supp. I 2001). The GAO
initially held back 50% of the funding until more concrete, actual losses could be
demonstrated. When this initial disbursement turned out to be overstated, the GAO
demanded refunds. See infra note 267.
iS8. See Elizabeth N. Berkowitz, The Problematic Role of the Special Master: Undermining the
Legitimacy of the September iith Victim Compensation Fund, 24 YALE L. & POL'Y REV.
(forthcoming 2005).
159. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
16o. Brannigan, supra note 35 (quoting Carol Hallet, President, ATA).
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losses so huge, so scary, that it wouldn't [be a] surprise . . . if there are
bankruptcies in spite of the government stabilization award.'' , 6 While the
bailout money was staving off imminent bankruptcies-as designed-and
specific carriers were emerging as stars, it was becoming clear that "things
[would] never be the same. ,,6 By the middle of November, after the crash of
American Flight 587, industry stock prices were down 38% since 9/11, with
large carriers losing 46% of their value.1
63
The biggest problem was that the pre-September ii cost structures, which
were already causing problems in August, were inoperable in the new demand
environment. US Airways saved $15 million by renegotiating hotel rates for its
crews, but still lost over $1.4 billion in the second half of 2001. American "quit
stocking magazines on its planes and cut out caviar for first-class international
travelers,"'16 4 only to see $1.3 billion in red ink build during the same period. To
make matters worse, Congress's delay in passing the Aviation Security Act was
imperiling any resurgence in consumer confidence, and unions -still smarting
from their exclusion from the ATSSSA-were not showing signs of
cooperation.
In the end, eight of the fourteen major carriers were compensated based on
actual losses, theoretically providing full compensation for the terrorist
attack.16 Nevertheless, even after receiving $4.6 billion in government funds,
the industry lost an additional $3 billion in 2001. 66 Fourth quarter and 2001
161. Anthony L. Velocci, Jr., Wall Street's Outlook for Airlines Sobering, AVIATION WK. & SPACE
TECH., Nov. 19, 2001, at 63 (quoting David Swierenga, Chief Economist, ATA).
162. Raymond E. Neidl, Things Will Never Be the Same I (ABN Amro, Equity Research Report,
Oct. 12, 2001) ("Long-term, permanent changes will have to be made in the way carriers are
managed and in the cost structure and salary expectations of the industry's highly skilled
workforce. The world has changed after September 11, and the airlines and its employees
will have to adjust or perish .... "). But see Glenn Engel, End of the World as We Know It?
Perhaps Not i (Goldman Sachs, Equity Research Report, Oct. 12, 2001).
163. My industry index is equally weighted and includes Alaska Airlines (ALK), American
(AMR), America West (AWA), Continental (CAL), Delta (DAL), Northwest (NWAC),
Southwest (LUV), and United (UALAQ). The large carriers index is also equally weighted
and excludes Alaska Airlines (ALK) and Southwest (LUV). Jonathan Lewinsohn, Database
of Post-9/11 Airline Stock Prices (last updated Oct. 7, 2005) (on file with author).
164. McCartney et al., supra note 11.
165. GAO, AVIATION ASSISTANCE: INFORMATION ON PAYMENTS MADE UNDER THE DISASTER
RELIEF AND INSURANCE REIMBURSEMENT PROGRAMS 27 (2003) (providing an overview of
ATSSSA implementation).
166. See AIR TRANSPORT ASS'N, STATE OF THE U.S. AIRLINE INDUSTRY: A REPORT ON RECENT
TRENDS FOR U.S. AIR CARRIERS, at i (2002) (predicting that total losses were "likely to
exceed $7 billion"). But see Raymond E. Neidl, Summary: Q40oi and 2001 Results-A Year To
Forget i (ABN Amro, Equity Research Report, Feb. 4, 2002) ("For the fourth quarter the
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capacity were down 15% and 3.5% respectively,' 6 7 due to the parking of 350
planes. 68 Despite this precipitous drop in capacity, load factors fell to 71.3%,
with the break-even load figure rising to a record 77%.169 For the year, the
industry recognized savings by laying off 80,300 airline employees,' 7' 20,000
fewer than predicted, but saw labor costs per employee nearly double the
compounded annual growth rate of the previous fourteen years. '7' Indeed,
average airline salaries remained 53% higher than the national mean. 172
The $5 billion successfully forestalled bankruptcies during 2001, but it was
clear that a number of airlines would be filing in the year ahead. It was time for
the second part of the ATSSSA to kick in, with troubled airlines being forced to
justify why their predicaments were related to September 11 and how their
survival-outside of bankruptcy-was "necessary... [to] maintaining a safe,
efficient, and viable commercial aviation system in the United States. 1' 73
The problem was that such demonstrations were difficult to make.
Congress had ceded rulemaking responsibility for the loan guarantees to the
notoriously tight-fisted OMB director Mitch Daniels, who only three days after
the attacks "sent a memo to agency heads, pushing them to hold the line on
disaster-related costs wherever possible."'74 Daniels did not disappoint,
developing rules that favored only those carriers that could demonstrate both
their importance to the economy and their ability to cut costs significantly."'
Congress then complemented Daniels's fiscal conservatism by stacking the
ATSB with representatives from the Federal Reserve and the Treasury
Department, two agencies that had fiercely opposed the bailout. 17 6 The going
would not be easy.
industry had a loss of $3 billion and for the full year the industry had a net loss of $6 billion,
which was the largest loss ever.").
167. See AIR TRANSPORT ASS'N, supra note 166, at 3.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 6 (noting that this was 14% of the workforce).
171. Id. at 5. Labor costs per employee reached $73,000 in 2OO, up from $68,700 in 2000.
172. Id. at 6.
173. ATSSSA, § 1o2(c)(1)(C), 49 U.S.C. § 40,1o note (Supp. I 2001) (providing standards for
ATSB review of loan guarantee applications).
174. John D. McKinnon & Jim VandeHei, Bush To Unveil Aid Package for Airlines, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 20, 2001, at A3.
175. OMB Air Carrier Guarantee Loan Program, 14 C.F.R. § 1300.1o(a)(3), (b) (2005).
176. The third representative was from the more airline-friendly Transportation Department.
Most of the Board's loan-guarantee rejections came in 2-1 votes. See Air Transp.
Stabilization Bd., U.S. Treasury, Meeting Minutes, http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/
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America West, a hybrid low-cost/hub-and-spoke carrier, overcame the
odds to receive the first loan guarantee in December 2001, largely because its
relatively inexpensive labor contracts and aircraft leases gave it little to gain
from reorganization in bankruptcy.' 77 As time went on, however, the ATSB got
tougher. By the next month, applications arrived from small regional carriers
Vanguard, Evergreen, National, Spirit, and Frontier, but the ATSB did not feel
that their survival was crucial to preserving the national aviation system17' The
major carriers, fearing the concessions the ATSB would demand in return for
loans, employed creative techniques to secure privately backed financing.179
Things were so slow at the ATSB that its executive director resigned,
complaining that he had "relatively little to do" and noting that "[t] he need for
the program is probably not as critical as some people might have thought it
would have been early on." ' Ultimately, as market conditions worsened
midway through 2002, the pace did pick up, although it never reached the
magnitude expected by some in Congress.
In the end, 8 ' the Board issued six loan guarantees, totaling $1.56 billion, in
support of $1.74 billion in loans. Some were more successful than others.
Frontier Air was awarded a loan guarantee that it repaid in full in December
2003, netting the government a profit on its investment. US Airways, on the
other hand, the recipient of a $900 million guarantee, filed for bankruptcy
twice in as many years, and has now merged with America West in the hopes
of transforming itself into a competitive low-cost carrier. i, United, which was
rejected by the ATSB before it filed for bankruptcy, requested a loan guarantee
domestic-finance/atsb/minutes (last visited Sept. 1, 2005) (collecting transcripts of Board
meetings since November 2ool).
177. The Phoenix-based airline also had a powerful political backer in Arizona Senator John
McCain, the ranking member of the Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation
Committee.
178. See Air Transp. Stabilization Bd., supra note 176. Some applications were eventually granted
conditional approvals.
179. See Editorial, Flying Without Bailouts, WALL ST. J., Aug. 12, 2002, at Alo (noting that
"airlines have raised $1i billion since September 11, not a dime of it from the government").
iso. Stephen Power, Head of Program To Assist Airlines Resigns from Post, WALL ST. J., May 1,
2002, at D3 (quoting Joseph P. Adams) (internal quotation marks omitted).
181. Although the deadline for submitting loan-guarantee applications was June 28, 2002, the
ATSB continues to accept amended applications from the fifteen carriers that made the
original cutoff.
isz. See Dan Fitzpatrick, The 'New' US Airways Hopes Its Ticker Symbol Will Be a Sign of Things
To Come, POST-GAzETrE.COM (Pittsburgh, Pa.), Aug. 1O, 2005, http://www.post-
gazette.con/pg/o5222/551199.stm (noting that the merged company chose "LCC," or low-
cost carrier, as its stock ticker symbol).
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to help it emerge, but was denied because the steps it had taken in bankruptcy
made it likely that it would succeed without government help.183
The work of the ATSB has had little effect on the airlines' stock market
performance. As of October 7, 2005, share prices of legacy carriers are down
77% since August 1o, 2001, 73% since markets reopened on September 17, 2001,
and 49% since the passage of the ATSSSA."84 The "big six" airlines alone-
American, United, Delta, Continental, Northwest and US Airways-lost over
$9 billion in 2004,185 and the outlook going forward is not optimistic.1 8 6 In
fact, as geopolitical unrest exerts pressure on world petroleum markets and
increased competition erodes margins at all levels of the industry, not even the
low-cost carriers have been able to protect their profitability. As a result,
JetBlue and Southwest are trading near their 52-week lows. These factors have
coalesced into a general perception that by forestalling a badly needed shakeout
in the industry, the ATSSSA might "actually have made matters worse.", 87
Even after receiving billions in government aid, the industry is on the brink.
How much worse could it possibly have been?
While not unreasonable, especially based on recent performance, this
conclusion overlooks a number of problems. First, it does not adequately
consider the precarious national climate in the days following September it.
The spectacle of carrier bankruptcies arising immediately after hijacked
airplanes had killed thousands of Americans would have dampened consumer
confidence, further imperiling the airlines' demand outlook. It would also have
sent an ominous signal that the government wished to avoid.
More importantly, simply because the airline industry has continued to
struggle does not mean that the ATSSSA exacerbated its problems. As noted
above, the OMB and the ATSB ensured that the loan guarantees were carefully
rationed, with credit being denied to a number of the weakest carriers. It is
183. See Letter from Michael Kestenbaum, Executive Dir., ASTB, to Frederic F. Brace, Executive
Vice President & CFO, United Air Lines (June 28, 2004), available at
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/js753.htm.
184. This legacy-carrier index is equally weighted and includes American (AMR), America West
(AWA), Continental (CAL), Delta (DAL), Northwest (NWAC), and United (UALAQJ. See
Lewinsohn, supra note 163.
18S. See Loren Farrar & Perry Flint, Legacy of Losses, AIR TRANSP. WORLD, March 2005, at 53.
186. Most recently, both Delta and Northwest, carriers that had been relatively healthy enough in
2002 to avoid applying for ATSB assistance, were forced to seek bankruptcy protection,
citing rising fuel costs. See Chris Isidore, Delta, Northwest File for Bankruptcy, CNN/MONEY,
Sept. 15, 2005, http://money.cnn.com/2oo/o9/14/news/fortune5oo/bankruptcy-airlines/
index.htm.
187. Micheline Maynard, Airline Bailout Fails To Do the Job, Some Experts Say, N.Y. TIMEs, May
14, 2004, at C2.
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doubtful that the $5 billion in aid would have been sufficient to provide a
permanent cushion to failing airlines.
To brand the ATSSSA a failure is to tell an incomplete story. Thus far, this
Note has provided the first detailed analysis of the ATSSSA's conception,
passage, and implementation. Assessing this process in a vacuum, however,
makes it difficult to understand the Act's significance or to criticize its results.
By upsetting the status quo, Congress was making an explicit statement about
the industry's predicament that can only be fully grasped in relation to
Congress's past behavior and legitimate alternatives. To truly assess the
ATSSSA requires evaluating the legislation through both normative (was it
good?) and comparative (was it the best option?) lenses.
III. THE ATSSSA: IN SEARCH OF JUDGMENT
The final Part of this Note will assess the ATSSSA by considering
comparative and efficiency theories, and evaluating the Act in light of other
possible options. This is not merely an academic exercise. As noted by
Representative Brian Kerns, in the event of additional attacks it is likely that
the airlines will be back for aid, 88 making it practically important to determine
whether the ATSSSA provides a workable model for future legislation.
As I argue below, bailouts are often the inevitable political response to
specific social and economic circumstances. 89 As such, bailouts should be
assessed by determining whether Congress enacted the best possible statute in
light of the political realities. But what metrics can be relied upon in making
this determination? What constitutes an ideal bailout? To (partially) answer
these questions, I will use this final Part as an opportunity to appraise the
ATSSSA and, in so doing, outline the contours of a model that can be used to
assess bailouts more broadly. Bailouts represent a temporary disruption of
free-market forces, yet this does not mean that they cannot comply with basic
notions of efficiency.' 90 At the very least, bailouts should avoid creating
perverse incentives and should be consciously structured in a manner that least
188. See House Hearings, supra note 21, at 73 (statement of Rep. Kerns).
i89. A similar conclusion has been applied to government regulation of the banking industry and
global bailouts of sovereign nations, but never to domestic corporate bailouts by the federal
government. See Jonathan R. Macey, The False Promise of De-Regulation in Banking 9 (Yale
Law Sch. Faculty Scholarship Series, Paper No. 2, 2005), available at
http://lsr.nellco.org/cgVviewcontent.cgi?article=iooi&context=yale/fss; see also Llewellyn
H. Rockwell, Jr., Financial Socialism, THE FREE MARKET, Nov. 1998, at 4.
19o. The success of a bailout often depends on how temporary the disruption is. See infra Section
III.A.
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distorts market forces. Congress should also publicly articulate the reasons for
its intervention to make clear that similar largesse will not necessarily be
available in the future (even in similar circumstances). Finally, where possible,
bailouts should be centered on actual congressional handouts -of funds or loan
guarantees -rather than covert options such as tax or antitrust suspensions.
This way, it will be harder for bailouts to be passed, more difficult for relatively
healthy industries or companies to lobby for congressional support, and less
likely that "emergency loopholes" will remain in place for the long term.
To show how the ATSSSA meets these standards and to argue for their
importance in assessing bailouts more generally, I will apply the traditional
economic arguments levied against bailouts to the ATSSSA, showing where
they fall short and offering normative defenses for the Act's passage. What
emerges is a portrait of an Act that was designed to meet a symbolic objective,
but that also satisfies a number of efficiency criteria. Having provided
justification for the Act, I will then compare the ATSSSA to other recent
bailouts, both in form and results, to determine what factors usually induce the
government to rescue companies or industries. This analysis will allow me to
evaluate the claim made by many in Congress and the industry that the
ATSSSA should not be considered a bailout. It will also reveal the problems
associated with comparative bailout assessments -what I call the "relative
results" model-and show the advantages offered by the assessment criteria
outlined above. From there, I will examine alternative constructions that
Congress might have considered, determining whether Congress made the
right choices given the political realities.
The ATSSSA is not a perfect statute. Yet its ability to stabilize an industry
in crisis without recasting traditional market principles or affirmatively
determining industry winners and losers makes it an important example for the
future.
A. (Overcoming) The Anti-Bailout Presumption
i. Perverse Incentives
Whenever the government provides assistance to a failing enterprise or
industry it encounters the criticism that by rewarding failure it is promoting
bad decisionmaking.'91 The thinking runs like this: Knowing the availability of
government assistance, future managers might be influenced to take liberties
without internalizing potential risks. This critique is based on the concept of
191. See Kosterlitz, supra note 99, at 2994.
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"moral hazard" and is one of the strongest arguments against government
intervention.
But its application to the ATSSSA is problematic. As exhibited consistently
in the committee hearings, the airline executives knew that the ATSSSA was a
response to the unanticipated terrorist attacks, and the groundstop in
particular.192 The Act does not stand for the proposition that the government
will rescue the airlines in the event of general economic catastrophe or even
another attack. If anything, its limited scope incentivizes airline executives to
internalize risk, because Congress has little interest in providing continuous aid
to the industry. Nowhere was this more obvious than in early 2002 when, amid
deteriorating market conditions, an ATA call for a second bailout, including tax
breaks and government assumption of security costs, 1 93 was met with outright
hostility'94 as the congressional perception of the industry returned to its pre-
attack lows.195
It is also unfair to conclude that the ATSSSA provided only negative
incentives. By disbursing aid to the airlines, the government was forestalling
the possibility of bankruptcy, allowing investors to shed some of their risk, and
promoting the type of investment necessary for the long-term viability of the
industry'9 6
2. Efficiency
Another (normative) critique leveled against bailouts in general is that they
sacrifice economic efficiency for the sake of social goals, thereby limiting
society's wealth.' 97 This criticism can be easily applied to the ATSSSA, because
its primary purpose was to avoid sending negative signals during a period of
192. Id. at 2995.
193. Martha Brannigan, As Their Losses Mount, Airlines Lobby Government for More Aid, WALL ST.
J., Sept. 23, 2002, atAi.
194. See id. (quoting ATSSSA supporter Representative John Mica: "There won't be a direct
bailout, period. That's not in the cards." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
195. See Stephen Power & Susan Carey, U.S. Turns Down United's Request for Loan Help-Carrier
Moves Closer to Chapter ii, Lacking $1.8 Billion Guarantee, WALL ST. J., Dec. 5, 2002, at Ai
(quoting a senior Bush Administration official as noting: "The public has little sympathy for
an industry that's been bailed out as often as the airline industry has." (internal quotation
marks omitted)); see also supra note 13 and accompanying text.
v96. Similar principles are involved when the government allows deductions to investors in oil
and gas exploration or seeks to reduce the capital gains tax. For more information, see
KENNETH J. ARROW, ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RISK-BEARING 135 (1971).
197. See, e.g., Daniel J. Gifford, Antitrust and Trade Issues: Similarities, Differences, and
Relationships, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 1049, 1071 (1995); Kosterlitz, supra note 99.
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national trauma. In general, a mature approach to bailouts would recognize
that when the government upsets the status quo it is consciously-and
normatively- choosing social and distributive objectives over pure efficiency.
Yet, because it is a common objection, it is important to show why social
objectives -especially those sought by the ATSSSA- are not always mutually
exclusive from efficiency.
It is not hard to see why economists tend to look disfavorably at bailouts.,9
8
Conventional wisdom holds that an efficient allocation of resources can only be
realized by the free market, where decisions are based on merit, price, quality,
performance, and prospects rather than politics or social agendas.' 99 To most
economic commentators, a political reaction to a crisis will inevitably be
shortsighted- "driven by short-run pressures rather than long-run
principles."2"' Moreover, bailouts tend to benefit the politically powerful at the
expense of others, and create a culture of moral hazard where imprudent risks
are implicitly promoted." 1 We have already seen how Congress managed to
avoid the promotion of moral hazard by tying the ATSSSA bailout to the
airlines' role in the attacks, insisting on the reimbursement of only "direct
losses," and refusing to seriously distort long-term competitive conditions. A
similar argument can now be made regarding the Act's purported inefficiency.
Although it occasionally operates under the political radar, 2 ' the
government routinely intervenes in the economy not only to accomplish social
objectives but also to smooth out results for the long term. The success of these
interventions "depends upon a host of variables which in the aggregate
determine whether the threatened industry .. is likely (subsequent to - and
because of- the intervention) to achieve a level of efficiency which will enable
it to prosper in the future.""°3 The terrorist attacks artificially and temporarily
compressed the demand for air travel, creating a glut of capitalized capacity
that might have forced many carriers into bankruptcy. Although under normal
circumstances debtor-in-possession financing would have been available to
help the strongest airlines emerge, the dearth of available capital in the
immediate aftermath of the attacks would likely have led to more liquidations
198. See Kosterlitz, supra note 99.
199. See, e.g., Blair, supra note 92, at 370 (noting that "private sector businesses will allocate
resources efficiently in response to prices determined in free markets").
2oo. Charles W. Calomiris, The IMF's Imprudent Role as Lender of Last Resort, CATO J., Winter
1998, at 275.
l1. Id. at 276.
202. For a discussion of the public's understanding of the government's intervention in the
purportedly "free market," see infra note 237 and accompanying text.
203. Gifford, supra note 197, at 1O74.
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(Chapter 7) than reorganizations (Chapter 11). By giving the airlines cash with
which to fund their overcapacity, the government was preserving the
possibility that the airlines could survive to supply a normalized market at a
profit. Had the government allowed the airlines to fail,2"4 capacity would have
had to be rebuilt once consumer preferences normalized -surely an inefficient
result.20
This answer is also helpful in responding to those critics who argue that the
ATSSSA would have been more efficient had it been limited to loan
guarantees. Bailouts are almost always an alternative to bankruptcy, a political
response designed to reach a solution outside the court-supervised
reorganization process. Yet as explained by Professor Reich in his seminal
study of government assistance programs,"°6 most bailouts actually come to
resemble bankruptcies in all but name. Due to the terms of the loan
guarantees -which were the cornerstone of the Chrysler, Lockheed, New York
City, and Continental Bank bailouts-the bailed-out companies were
"refinanced and reorganized, assets were redeployed," and cash was generated
through partial liquidations.07 In all cases, the enterprises were substantially
downsized and emerged from their bailouts with leaner balance sheets and
improved operational efficiency. Professor Reich dubs this bailout-induced
process "slow bankruptcy," designed for instances where "given the size and
importance of these companies to their economies, bankruptcy would release
vast resources far more quickly than the market could absorb them.",2 8 In
other words, while the entities involved all needed to be drastically downsized,
bankruptcy would have worked too quickly and with too much market
disruption. Free-market advocates in Congress generally supported these
endeavors because the assistance was seen as a means of slowing down the
inevitable shrinkage of the enterprise, not as a permanent subsidy.
The foundation of the ATSSSA, however, was just such a ($5 billion)
permanent subsidy, the type "generally . . . provided to individuals and
businesses that suffer dramatic losses from natural disasters such as hurricanes,
tornadoes, and floods."20 9 Because most carriers did not take advantage of the
204. The efficiency justifications that follow mostly accept the congressional view that, absent
aid, a host of carriers would have failed in the weeks following the attacks.
205. This conclusion hinges on a near-term to medium-term capacity recovery. At a certain
point, cost-of-capital considerations would warrant the liquidation and subsequent
rebuilding of capacity.
2o6. Reich, supra note 43.
207. See id. at 188.
208. Id. at 196.
209. Block, supra note 86, at 956.
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loan guarantees, they were never forced to grant concessions to the ATSB and
hence never experienced the efficiency-enhancing quasi-bankruptcy described
by Professor Reich.
Yet once again, these arguments take a shortsighted view of efficiency. Due
to the magnitude of the groundstop losses, a number of airlines needed cash,
rather than just additional credit, to avoid filing for bankruptcy in the days and
weeks following September ii. Not only would these filings have sent a
devastating signal, they would have led to highly inefficient bankruptcy
proceedings.21 The bankruptcy courts would have been forced to approach
each company's predicament independently, comparing each carrier's capacity
and outlook to its particular liabilities. With the long-term revenue picture
clouded by the attacks, this might have necessitated more concessions or
liquidations than the normalized market would demand. The $5 billion
ATSSSA subsidy offered a centralized solution that could delay bankruptcy
until a time when demand outlook would be more realistic.21' This, in turn,
could allow the bankruptcy courts to orchestrate a more efficient adjustment in
capacity than they might have in late 2OOl.
Thus, while the ATSSSA did not automatically trigger the reorganization
of the industry, as previous bailouts had, its combination of subsidy and
bailout kept open two possibilities: (1) "Normal" bankruptcy filings after the
$5 billion ran out, presumably in a period of greater clarity, or (2) "slow-
bankruptcy" through the loan guarantees, as mandated by the ATSB. Either
way, market underperformers would be forced to reorganize - by cutting
costs -in order to survive.
It should also be noted that, if one accepts the importance of the airline
industry to the national economy, then the ATSSSA might even be considered
Pareto or Kaldor-Hicks efficient. Redistributive choices, such as bailouts,
usually result in winners and losers. A redistribution is Pareto efficient,
however, when it manages to create winners by enlarging the pie rather than
making some people (losers) worse off.21 Kaldor-Hicks efficiency modifies this
21o. The ATSSSA was passed as a public relations measure -to ensure that no airlines filed for
bankruptcy in the period immediately following the attacks. That it also satisfies a number
of efficiency criteria is simply a testament to the success of its construction.
211. One could still argue, however, that the $5 billion was too generous and the goal might have
been accomplished with less direct aid.
212. "In contrast, a situation is Pareto optimal if no such changes can be made; that is, there is no
way to make one person better off without causing some other person to be worse off."
Block, supra note 86, at iooo. The theory of Pareto Efficiency was first developed in
VILFREDO PARETO, COURS D'ECONOMIE POLITIQUE (1896), reprinted in SOCIOLOGICAL
WRITINGS 9 7 (S. E. Finer ed., Derick Mirfin trans., 1966).
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notion by defining efficient outcomes as those where the winners could
theoretically compensate the losers.
It is easy to see how the ATSSSA might be able to meet these efficiency
criteria. While tax assets are redistributed from the general coffers to the
airlines, the commercial aviation network is saved to benefit many other
economic actors, thereby (re-)enlarging the shrunken post-September 11 "pie."
As explained by Representative Steven LaTourette during committee hearings:
Those who block this legislation are shortsighted. It is not just the
airlines and [their] jobs on the line. There are thousands who build
supplies, service and support the industry who are suffering, from
Boeing, GE, Pratt and Whitney to the small machine shop, the repair
stations and even the King Nut Company in Solon, Ohio that puts the
peanuts in the bags that you get when you get on the plane.213
The industries benefiting from the survival of the airlines could easily have
compensated those made worse off by the ATSSSA (e.g., nonflying taxpayers).
The trick was first to believe that the airlines would actually fail without aid,
and then to ensure that the redistributed funds did not exceed the benefit
accrued to society as a whole.
Finally, the ATSSSA's efficiency can also be justified on account of the
externalities produced by a functioning commercial aviation industry. An
externality exists when "the costs of producing a good or the benefits from
consuming a good spill over to individuals who are not producing or
consuming the good."2 1 4 When the externalities produced by a specific failing
industry rise to the status of a public good, then efficiency might be enhanced
by taxing the public at large to support its bailout."'5 Professor Blair argues that
it is possible to see each route in the air transportation system -each spoke, so
to speak-as producing valuable externalities." 6 This argument encounters
difficulties when applied to a single airline, which can fail without imperiling
the network, but when faced with the possibility of mass carrier failure, as the
213. House Hearings, supra note 21, at 11.
214. Blair, supra note 92, at 371 n.33 (quoting JOHN B. TAYLOR, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS
516 (Denise Clinton ed., 1995)).
215. See id. at 371 ("Economists generally agree that efficiency can be enhanced by taxing citizens
to provide government subsidies for public goods and for other goods or activities that have
positive externalities." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
216. Id. at 374.
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ATSSSA Congress believed it was, it is easy to see how $15 billion might
actually be a small price to pay to conserve network ubiquity.217
As the ATSSSA recedes in time we will be able to gauge the mathematical
success of these efficiency arguments more accurately. Yet what is certain even
now is that it would be foolish to write off the Act as presumptively inefficient.
More to the point, it would also be unfortunate to dismiss the ATSSSA on
normative grounds. The Act ameliorated an inevitably bad situation. Some
action - either public or private - was needed to avoid the symbolic catastrophe
of mass bankruptcies immediately following the attacks and, as just discussed,
the Act can be justified on account of its incentives, efficiencies, and
externalities. Whether the ATSSSA was the best possible response, creating,
for example, the optimal incentives or efficiencies, is a separate question, to
which this Note now turns.
B. Comparative Analysis
i. Retrospective Comparison: Relative Results
One way to determine the ATSSSA's success is to compare the airlines'
post-bailout performance with that of the other firms, industries, and
municipalities that have previously received federal relief from financial
distress. As highlighted throughout this Note, the government has had
significant recent experience in this area, and at first glance, the ATSSSA has
problems measuring up. Although Chrysler once again experienced problems
in the early 199os, culminating in its "merger" with Daimler-Benz,21s it took
only two years after federal intervention for the company to swing from a $300
million loss to a $700 million profit. 19 More importantly, "Chrysler was able
to generate sufficient cash to retire the entire $1.2 billion in guaranteed
indebtedness . . . approximately two years in advance of the scheduled
repayment and seven years ahead of the time when repayment would have
217. Professor Blair also raises the possibility that the aviation industry's huge fixed costs might
brand it a natural monopoly. Id. at 373-74. As such, she argues, the ATSSSA may have been
efficient because it ensured the use of the expensive, underutilized capacity. See id. at 373.
This conclusion, however, is likely incorrect, because capacity utilization could have been
more efficiently increased by offering subsidies to travelers.
218. Although executives from both companies deemed the transaction a "merger of equals," it
was for all intents and purposes the acquisition of Chrysler by the German automotive
giant. See BIL VLASIC & BRADLEY A. STERTZ, TAKEN FOR A RIDE: How DAIMLER-BENZ
DROVE OFF WITH CHRYSLER (2001).
219. Reich, supra note 43, at 186.
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been required."" 0 This translated into a significant profit for the government.
Lockheed22 ' and the City of New York,2" other high-profile bailout recipients,
also rebounded quickly, repaying their debts without calling on the federal
guarantees and covering the government's administrative costs.
Of course, not all government bailouts are as successful as Chrysler,
Lockheed, and New York, and many end up involving substantial government
expenditures. Yet in most instances, such programs are funded from revenue
sources (somehow) related to the bailout recipients. For example, when
regulators supply funds to failing banks, they use special insurance pools under
the federal deposit insurance system that are not generated from general tax
revenues. 3 In 1989, the government followed this path to bail out the savings
and loan industry,7 using the general treasury only once funds from thrift-
related sources were depleted."' A similar scheme involving the Airport and
Airways Trust Fund, which contained a surplus of more than $12 billion on
September 11, was proposed for the funding of the ATSSSA but was never able
to gain traction.
Thus, by the standard of competitive results, the ATSSSA does not
immediately emerge as a successful use of government funds. The airline
industry is still reeling, shareholders have been left largely undiluted, 27 and the
220. Block, supra note 86, at 963 n.43 (quoting CHRYSLER CORP. LOAN GUARANTEE BD., REPORT
TO CONGRESS: OCT. 1, 1982 TO SEPT. 30, 1983, at 2).
221. See Emergency Loan Guarantee Act, Pub. L. No. 92-70, 85 Stat. 178 (1971) (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 1841 (2ooo)). On its face, this Act appeared to authorize federal loan guarantees to
many struggling enterprises, but it was written in a manner that practically excluded all
applicants besides Lockheed.
222. See New York City Loan Guarantee Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-339, 92 Stat. 460 (loan
authority terminated June 30, 1982); New York City Seasonal Financing Act of 1975, Pub. L.
No. 94-143, 89 Stat. 797 (loan authority terminated June 30, 1978).
223. Block, supra note 86, at 963.
224. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 1-73,
103 Star. 183 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1811 (2000)).
225. "[F]unds for the bailout were to come [first] from sale of assets taken from banks in
receivership, the sale of nonvoting capital stock to Federal Home Loan Banks, assessments
against certain savings and loan banks, and the issuance of obligations." Block, supra note
86, at 964.
226. See Crandall, supra note 76.
227. In many instances the disbursement of bailout funds is conditioned on the wipeout of
shareholders, which allows the government to recoup its investment with an initial public
offering. See, e.g., 147 CONG. REC. S959o (daily ed. Sept. 21, 2001) (statement of Sen.
Fitzgerald).
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government is on the hook for significant loan guarantees.228 Yet, to a certain
extent, this is exactly the outcome the ATSSSA's drafters anticipated. Before
September 11, there was a general perception that a shakeup- involving
multiple bankruptcies-was needed in the airline industry. Without the
ATSSSA, the terrorist attacks would have immediately hastened this process,
creating an unpalatable symbol of American frailty. As I argued in Part I, the
ATSSSA was not aimed at nursing the airlines to health in the manner of the
Chrysler, Lockheed, and New York City bailouts. It was about temporary
stabilization, with the government interfering with markets only to the extent
necessary to avoid bankruptcies in the months following the attacks.
Accordingly, the industry's current predicament- including its multiple
bankruptcies post-2OO1 - demonstrates the Act's success.
This counterintuitive conclusion shows the futility of judging a bailout
based on comparative "results." Almost by definition, bailouts are reactions to
unique circumstances. The recipients of such funds are usually facing different
challenges, with their relative successes relating back to their independent
starting points. Any profit, or loss, can only attain meaning based upon the
initial costs incurred and the problem avoided. Accordingly, in judging the
ATSSSA it might be more appropriate to assess bailouts prospectively to
determine the factors that usually precipitate their use and extract objective
principles for determining their success.
2. Prospective Comparison
A bailout becomes possible, i.e., it reaches its first step, once its proponents
are successful in framing their corporate problem in the language of national
interest. A bailout has occurred when government assistance protects managers
and investors while preserving the enterprise as a going concern. 9 To reach
the conclusion of step one, however, and to then ensure that it materializes as a
bailout (step two), requires passing a number of social and economic tests.
As explained by Professor Reich, government assistance is usually awarded
to companies facing drastic cash shortages. Requests are most successful when
they come amid particularly turbulent economic conditions and can be
presented as exceptional."' An entity seeking aid must demonstrate that (1) its
228. Hearing on Financial Condition, supra note 39, at 107 (testimony of Michael Kestenbaum,
Executive Director, ATSB) ("[T]here is always a risk of eventual defaults given the
challenges the industry continues to face.").
229. See Block, supra note 86, at 961.
230. When discussing the Chrysler bailout, which was much more controversial at the time than
the ATSSSA, Representative Jim Wright, the House Majority Leader, warned that that a
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liquidity difficulties are threatening its existence; (2) bankruptcy would
produce certain undesirable consequences; and (3) due to its "bigness,"
liquidation would severely distress the economic health of entire regions.23'
Such a three-pronged showing forces legislators, especially those from the
affected areas, "to choose between responding to the fears of its citizens by
bailing out [the] collapsing giant[], or, alternatively, adhering to the precepts
of private enterprise and declining pleas for government rescue."232 The choice
is usually fairly easy (especially in election years). Due to their size, Chrysler,
Lockheed, and New York City were able to claim that their problems amounted
to national calamity while also marshaling the political capital to gain support
from the executive and legislative branches.
In this sense, the ATSSSA is the typical congressional bailout: The
immediate lack of cash, the sense of calamity, the fear that the national
economy could come unhinged, and the "bigness" of the industry made it
certain that some sort of congressional aid would follow. In fact, the seamless
way in which the ATSSSA fits with previous congressional bailouts-in
circumstances rather than results-infuses the Act with a certain sense of
inevitability. The idea that markets represent the most efficient use of social
resources and are the key to maximizing wealth is central to our national ethos.
But as explained by Professor Gifford "[t]hese powerful attributes of free
markets and free trade become mythologized . . .when their operational
characteristics are suppressed in an exclusive focus upon their general
results."23  Like Europeans,2 4  Americans are not comfortable with
untrammeled markets ; 135 they are simply more attached to the idea. Thus, the
same economic philosophy that gives us free trade also identifies concepts such
Chrysler bankruptcy would cost the federal government between $14 and $15 billion and
plunge the nation into a full-scale recession. As we saw above, many in Congress made
similarly apocalyptic statements regarding the airlines. See Reich, supra note 43, at 191-92.
231. See WALTER IPPMANN, THE GOOD SOCIETY 224 (1936) (discussing the notion of "bigness"
and the "tragedies of semi-obsolete corporate leviathans that are unable to live and unable to
die"); Walter Adams & James W. Brock, Corporate Size and the Bailout Factor, 21 J. ECON.
ISSUES 61 (1987).
232. Walter Adams & James W. Brock, Antitrust, Ideology, and the Arabesques of Economic Theory,
66 U. COLO. L. REv. 257, 270 (1995). In fact, the success of large enterprises in attracting
congressional aid has led many to the conclusion that the "government bailout dilemma
illustrates the manner in which corporate giantism radically changes the essential nature of
political and economic systems." Id. at 269.
233. Gifford, supra note 197, at 1O54.
234. See H. W. de Jong, European Capitalism: Between Freedom and Social Justice, io REv. OF
INDUS. ORG. 399 (1995).
235. See Russell K. Osgood, The Ages and Themes of Income Taxation: Savings and Investment, 68
CORNELL L. REV. 521, 550-51 (1983).
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as illegal concentrations of capital, the free-rider problem, strategic behavior,
and predatory pricing.236 The problem caused by the terrorist attacks is just
another category of disturbance likely to attract congressional bailout funds.
This realization leads to two immediate conclusions. The first is: Due to
the pervasiveness of the free enterprise ethos, bailouts will only emerge at the
last minute, accomplished ad hoc, usually by indirect means such as tax credits
or loan guarantees. This way, the system can function as people truly want
(ideologically) without forcing policymakers to demythologize the free
market. 3 ' The second conclusion is that, given the right set of factors, a
government bailout should be considered the rule rather than the exception. As
such, the way to assess the eventual congressional action is to consider what
alternatives (e.g., tax relief versus direct compensation) might have done a
better job of responding to the political realities. In the case of the ATSSSA, we
should judge Congress by asking whether the ATSSSA forestalled near-term
bankruptcies in the manner least offensive to the long-term functioning of the
free market.
C. Monday Morning Quarterbacking the ATSSSA
1. Covert Options
The ATSSSA's drafters tried to develop a bill that would enhance the
liquidity position of the nation's carriers and avert a symbolic meltdown of the
commercial aviation industry without seriously distorting long-term market
forces or making it easy for other industries to lobby for similar aid. To
accomplish these goals, they had a number of options, each of which came with
its own risks, rewards, and consequences.
One of the earliest proposals offered by the industry,38 and Wall Street 39
was the short-term suspension of the carriers' $48 billion tax liability. 4° While
the specific proposals differed, the industry sought a one-year suspension of
the 4.4-cent-per-gallon tax on jet fuel, amounting to $1 billion, as well as the
236. See generally MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 15, 9-32 (1962) (noting that
"[t]he existence of a free market does not of course eliminate the need for government").
237. See Gifford, supra note 197, at 1054.
238. See Crandall, supra note 76.
239. See Higgins & Kennedy, supra note 19, at i.
240. Neidl, supra note 19, at 2 (noting that this sum consisted of $30 billion in excise taxes and
$18 billion in peripheral taxes).
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rebate of $7 billion in annual ticket and cargo taxes. 41 This tax-based solution
would have supplied the airlines with instant liquidity in an efficient and
administratively simple manner. It would also have been consistent with
precedent, because entire bailouts, such as that of the Penn Central Railroad,
have centered on tax subsidies.'4
This reasoning ultimately led Congress to include a modest two-month tax
extension in the ATSSSA, 43 but it was not enough to make tax subsidies the
cornerstone of the Act. By the time the ATSSSA was passed, Amtrak,'" the
Post Office,"4 and the steel industry 6 had officially requested federal
assistance. Once the precedent of tax relief was set with the airlines, it would
have been too easy for these industries to find congressional support for their
own rebates. Big grants, on the other hand, are much harder to get passed and
tend to require all of the factors discussed above such as cash shortage and
"bigness." If a tax-based solution had been used to respond to the airlines'
predicament it might have opened the floodgates, distorting a host of markets
outside of commercial aviation.
A similar rationale was used to dismiss a popular proposal that would have
temporarily relaxed two specific antitrust restrictions. Facing a glut of capacity
along with political pressure to continue flying to the regional airports utilized
by many members of Congress, the airlines requested limited antitrust
immunity to collectively coordinate service reductions. 47 Like the tax subsidies,
there was precedent for this request. In 1970, Congress -citing the "public
interest" - had allowed newspapers to enter into joint operating arrangements





241. See Jim VandeHei & John D. McKinnon, Aftermath: Securing Air Travel: Airlines Will Get
Bailout, but Not All of Their Requests, WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 20O1, at A9.
242. Specifically, these bailouts have included the liberalization of the net-operating-loss carry-
forward rules affecting the company. See Osgood, supra note 235, at 549.
243. ATSSSA, § 301(a)(1), 49 U.S.C. § 40,1O1 note (Supp. 1 2001) (creating an extension subject
to the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury).
z Editorial, Free Riders, WALL ST. J., Oct. 2, 20o, at A18.
z45. See Nicholas Kulish, Questions of Security: Postal Service Seeks $5 Billion Bailout for Attacks'
Fallout, WAUL ST. J., Nov. 9, 2001, at A8.
246. See Helene Cooper et al., Bailout Request Stirs Industrial-Policy Issue: Bush Is Leery of Slippery
Slope in Steel-Sector Bid, WAL ST. J., Dec. 6, 2001, at A2.
247. See John D. McKinnon et al., U.S. Moves Toward Aid Pool of $4o Billion, WALL ST. J., Sept.
14,2001, atA3.
248. Newspaper Preservation Act, Pub. L. No. 91-353, § 2, 84 Stat. 466, 466 (1970) (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 18oi (2000)).
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In addition to the request for collective action, the airlines also asked for an
easing of merger restrictions. Just six weeks before the attacks, the Justice
Department had blocked a proposed merger between US Airways and United
out of fear that it would hurt consumers in the Northeast where the two
airlines share a dominant market position. 49 Now, after the attacks had
imperiled the industry, the carriers hoped that the "failing firm defense" -
authorizing mergers despite their anticompetitive effects -would be codified in
the ATSSSA. The Justice Department has historically employed this major
exception to antitrust law due to the "suffering of employees, shareholders, and
others who would be affected by a firm's collapse."2"' Surely, the airlines
argued, the social disruption that would accompany airline liquidations
merited just such an easing of antitrust restrictions.
In the end, however, Congress had no choice but to reject both antitrust
approaches. A less restrictive merger-review process would have done little to
solve the airlines' problems; any pro forma company would still have been
saddled with the crippling debt and labor costs which were at the root of the
industry's struggles."' For once, airlines could not easily merge their way out
of trouble. The proposal to allow limited collaboration was more strategically
sound, as it would have enabled the airlines to reduce capacity without blindly
eliminating all service to certain regional airports. Yet once such a suspension
was granted, it would have been hard to stop the airlines from collaborating to
give single carriers virtual monopolies on certain routes. Fearing what this
would do to prices, Congress chose instead to allocate $120 million to the
Essential Air Service (EAS),252 and to give the Treasury Secretary authority to
require carriers to "to maintain scheduled air service to any point served by that
carrier before September i, 2001. "12 3 This was not necessarily the most
efficient solution, and in fact, it did little to stop the process of carrier
249. See Jayne O'Donnell, United, US Airways Call Off Merger, USAToDAY.COM, July 27, 2001,
http://www.usatoday.con/money/biztraveV2oo1-o7-27-justice-department.htm.
25o. Block, supra note 86, at 971. An earlier version of the guidelines specifically explained that
"when the elements of the defense are satisfied, there is a conclusive presumption that the
anticompetitive dangers associated with the merger are outweighed by the income losses to
creditors, stockholders, and communities associated with the failure of the firm." DOJ
Merger Guidelines, 47 Fed. Reg. 28,493, 28,502 n.54 (June 30, 1982).
251. In fact, it is likely that a merger would actually exacerbate the tensions between labor and
management, making it even harder for the newly formed company to control costs.
a2. ATSSSA, § lo5(a)-(b), 49 U.S.C. § 40,1O1 note (Supp. 1 2001).
253. Id. § 105(c)(1). EAS was put into place at the time of deregulation to guarantee that small
communities maintained a minimal level of scheduled air service. The Department of
Transportation currently subsidizes commuter airlines to serve approximately 14o rural
communities across the country that otherwise would not receive any scheduled air service.
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retrenchment that had begun in 20oo,2 s4 but Congress was not eager to see
where the slippery slope of temporary suspensions of law would take it.
Beyond tax and antitrust changes, the industry lobbied for a number of
other passive exemptions, including relief from collective bargaining restraints,
incentives to ground older aircraft, and a safety net for displaced workers.2 5 All
of these requests, along with the antitrust and tax proposals, would have
amounted to what is known as a covert bailout: an assistance plan that
provides relief from compliance with burdensome regulations.2, 6  U.S.
industries regularly lobby for such "bailouts,"' s7 which usually avoid the type
of attention that accompanies overt cash assistance.
In the case of the ATSSSA, however, Congress was not interested in a
covert response. More than wanting to make it difficult for other industries to
follow the airlines, Congress was hoping to use the ATSSSA to publicly
pronounce the nation's support for commercial aviation. If the discussion of
previous bailouts reveals anything, it is that when the political factors coalesce
to make a bailout likely, Congress is usually trying to accomplish a panoply of
social objectives. A covert ATSSSA could not have been as easily linked to the
groundstop, and would not have bred the type of confidence in the industry
that comes from disbursement of cash."' Congress did not want to end
deregulation or even protect struggling carriers from the difficulties of
bankruptcy. It simply wanted to postpone carrier bankruptcy filings past the
immediate fallout from the attacks and the upcoming war in Afghanistan. By
accomplishing this, without severely distorting the industry or allowing other
companies to receive similar handouts, Congress succeeded in choosing
options that diffused the crisis without simultaneously contributing to another.
254. See Maynard, supra note 94 (noting that "[o]ne-third of the nation's 6o9 airports offering
daily flights are served by just one airline").
25. House Hearings, supra note 21, at io6-o8 (statement of Scott Gibson, Senior Vice President,
Simat Helliesen & Eichner, Inc., International Air Transport Consultancy).
256. See Block, supra note 86, at 968 (contrasting overt and covert bailouts).
257. See id. at 969-73 (providing examples of covert bailouts).
2S8. Over and over, members of Congress speaking in support of the Act referenced its role in
restoring consumer confidence in the commercial aviation system. See, e.g., 147 CONG. REC.
S9597 (Sept. 21, 2001) (statement of Sen. Domenici) ("These loans will also restore the
confidence of the private capital markets, which are unwilling to lend the airlines."); id. at
S96o3 (statement of Sen. Enzi) ("The provisions of this bill are designed to restore the
confidence of airline customers and industry investors."). While it is unlikely that the Act
was able to influence the long-term demand for airline travel, Congress was hoping that its
provisions would be a first step, along with new security provisions, toward demonstrating
that things would return to normal in the nation's skies.




The success of the Act notwithstanding, it is important to point out briefly
areas where Congress could have done things differently without sacrificing its
symbolic objectives. The biggest oversight was the Act's failure to secure
private sector concessions from Wall Street and organized labor. By
postponing carrier bankruptcies and providing cash for the airlines to use in
servicing debt, Congress was doing a considerable service for both equity and
debt investors. As noted by Harry Pinson, an airline investment banker
testifying before the Senate Commerce Committee, Wall Street stood to gain
considerably from an airline revival:
We, in our industry, are eager to get back to the business of financing
this industry .... It is our livelihood. The rebuilding of this industry
will generate terrific investment opportunities which will attract the
capital necessary to fund the future of this industry and eventually
supplant the aid you are considering." 9
Before agreeing to supply loan guarantees to Chrysler, Treasury Secretary
G. William Miller insisted that the plan include large financial concessions
from its lenders. 6 ° Why? Because even the temporary postponement of
bankruptcy provides investors with a cost-of-capital advantage. Instead of
hoping that the cash and loan guarantees would reopen the capital markets,
Congress should have required the airlines to negotiate specific concessions
with Wall Street that would have allowed the airlines to fund operations in the
near-term without worrying about default. Based on Pinson's analysis above, it
is unlikely that Wall Street would have rejected these requirements.
The issue of labor concessions was more complicated, because the unions
and their congressional backers already believed the ATSSSA to be anti-
worker. The truth, however, is that most laws affecting the airline industry
work strongly in the reverse. The ATSSSA was never meant to radically
overhaul the carrier-labor relationship (or anything for that matter), but
Congress would have been wise to use the opportunity to bring labor costs in
line with operational realities.26' After all, labor concessions were a crucial pre-
condition to the Chrysler bailout, even though the contracts enjoyed by
Chrysler's workers were also the result of poor management decisions.
259. Id. at S9582 (statement of Harry Pinson, Managing Director, Credit Suisse First Boston).
26o. Reich, supra note 43, at 182.
261. Even before September ii, a proposal was floating in Congress to subject impasses in airline
collective bargaining to binding arbitration. See Airline Labor Dispute Resolution Act, S.
1327, 107th Cong. (2001).
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Working on the margins, Congress could have tinkered with the Railway
Labor Act of 1926262 and § 1113 of the Bankruptcy Code,263 or it might have
considered establishing a more radical arbitration requirement. This certainly
would have broadened the Act's monolithic focus on direct attack costs;
however, the groundstop itself would not have been as catastrophic had labor
costs been less prohibitive.
Congress also should have developed a more equitable system for allocating
the $5 billion in direct aid. Under the terms of the Act, carriers were entitled to
the lesser of their documented September ii losses or their proportional August
capacity, measured in available-seat-miles (ASMs).2 64 Seventy-nine percent of
carriers were compensated using the ASM metric,265 which benefited the high-
capacity, low-yield legacy airlines that had been flying with empty seats before
September 11. During the days leading up to the passage of the Act, the large
hub-and-spoke airlines, using the platform of the ATA, pressured their smaller
peers to present a united front before Congress. Accordingly, when questioned
by the House, John Kelly, President and CEO of Alaska Airlines, testified that
ASMs were "the fairest way to allocate the money. ',, 66 By using ASMs,
however, Congress was compensating the legacy carriers for their overcapacity
and penalizing the far more efficient high-yield, low-cost carriers. In an act that
was based on making up for direct losses, compensation should have been
about revenue replacement. This could have been easily accomplished by using
the airlines' quarterly statements to derive their relative capacities. The unified
front orchestrated by the major airlines stopped Congress from truly
considering the problem and thus undermined an act otherwise focused on
efficiency and real losses.
D. Outlines of a Model
In this final Part, I have tried to provide a normative and comparative
assessment of the ATSSSA that responds to the Act's critics by exhibiting its
262. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (2000). The Railway Labor Act applies only to the railroad and airline
industries and, in the event of strike, forces workers and management into a collective
bargaining process so as not to disrupt service. If talks fail, the National Mediation Board
can require that both parties enter a thirty-day "cooling off" period. See Wong, supra note 6.
263 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (2000).
264. For a breakdown of what each carrier actually received, see U.S. Dept. of Transp., Office of
Pub. Affairs, Carrier Payments, http://www.dot.gov/affairs/carrierpayments.htm (last
visited Sept. 1, 2005).
265. GAO, supra note 165, at 27.
266. House Hearings, supra note 21, at 58.
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efficiency and demonstrating the general optimality of its structure. In the
process, however, I have sketched the broad outline of a model that can be used
to assess future statutes. Successful bailouts, like the ATSSSA, are structured in
a manner least distortive to the free market and in line with general goals of
market efficiency. They are accompanied by clear congressional explanations
and contain overt provisions that are not easily duplicated or prolonged. They
should be assessed by examining their political circumstances, keeping in mind
their symbolic objectives, and determining whether Congress might have been
able to respond in a more efficient, less distortive manner.
It is of course true that this model views bailouts as politically inevitable (to
a certain extent), and works to expose the frailty of an approach that condemns
bailouts entirely. By approaching bailouts in this manner, however, I am not
trying to excuse congressional actions that unnecessarily compromise free
markets and distort the competitive nature of the global economy. In fact, the
lesson to take from this analysis of the ATSSSA is that almost all of Congress's
actions reflected the goal of restoring the ex ante position with minimal market
distortion. The $5 billion was disbursed quickly, in order to stem imminent
bankruptcy filings, yet was subjected to an exacting GAO review of each
carrier's claimed losses.26 7 Congress went to similar lengths to ensure that the
loan guarantees would be limited to cases of necessity by delegating
rulemaking authority to the tight-fisted OMB director and stacking the ATSB
with members from the Federal Reserve and the Treasury Department. Thus,
by illustrating the economic efficiency of the largely symbolic ATSSSA, I am
cautioning future congressional drafters to keep both attributes in mind when
approaching bailouts.
My appraisal of the ATSSSA also questions the usefulness of bailout
assessments that concentrate on relative results. As I explained, the social and
economic circumstances surrounding bailout recipients are often similar, but
the congressional goals are not always equally matched. For the Chrysler
bailout to succeed (i.e., for it to respond to the political realities), the company
needed to fully regain its footing and continue employing thousands of
(unionized) workers. By contrast, the ATSSSA's success is marked by the
continued struggles of the industry even after its temporary reprieve. Not all
comparisons, however, are equally irrelevant. While September 11 was a unique
event, Congress wisely recognized that many of the ATSSSA's provisions, most
notably the loan guarantees, could be culled from previous federal assistance
267. When this initial disbursement turned out to be overstated, the GAO demanded refunds,
forcing US Airways to actually book an additional $11 million in paper losses for the fourth
quarter. See Susan Carey & Melanie Trottman, Northwest, US Airways Continue Industry's
Losing Streak, WALL ST. J., Jan. 18, 2002, at B6.
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efforts. Comparisons are thus highly valuable in structuring bailouts, as well as
in determining what action is called for in particular circumstances. The
limitation, the one my model attempts to remedy, is in using comparative
financial results to assess the relative success of a bailout.
That this discussion suggests an optimal model for assessing bailouts in
general is an indication of the ATSSSA's success. That said, developing a
standardized assessment tool for statutes that respond to extraordinary
circumstances is an exercise fraught with peril.
CONCLUSION
This Note has endeavored to provide the first detailed assessment and
defense of the ATSSSA by reviewing the discussions that led to the Act, its
philosophical basis, its implementation, and finally its influence on the
industry.
The ATSSSA was passed in a fluid, chaotic environment where normal
political and economic considerations were upended by doomsday scenarios. In
the tumultuous days following the terrorist attacks, industry forecasts were
nothing more than blind estimates, with the only available comparisons -the
Gulf War and Pan Am 103 -offering little guidance. The ATSSSA emerged as a
way to stabilize the airlines just long enough for the country to once again
become comfortable with the sometimes brutal functioning of market forces.
In that regard, it was a considerable achievement that can be referenced in the
unfortunate event of future need.
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